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The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms
Charles J. Goetzt
and Robert E. Scottj
Although trade and its defining terms lie at the very core of contract
law, perceptions of the state's involvement in the exchange process re-
main peculiarly incomplete. Everyone understands that the state sup-
plies the fundamental property-defining rules for pre-trade endowments.
For instance, governmentally provided rules of tort, nuisance, and civil
rights establish basic boundaries of what initially belongs to an individual
and, hence, what he has to offer in exchange. When an exchange subse-
quently takes place, however, the parties themselves assume an impor-
tant part of the burden of communicating what rights are being given
and received. Although the state's general rules of contract provide a set
of standard gap-filling assumptions or implied terms, almost every agree-
ment requires the parties to provide some additional individualized con-
tent. At one level, the private and state-supplied terms of an executory
contract represent an attempted interparty communication of the sub-
stantive entitlements intended to be exchanged. Since, however; the
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terms communicate evidence of the exchange's content to the state as
well, they also constitute the principal legal definition of the rights reallo-
cation. Unfortunately, this definitional process requires parties to em-
ploy inherently error-prone signals-the "formulations" of their
agreement.' If the chosen combination of privately and publicly supplied
terms results in an inappropriate formulation, a party may suffer a costly
surprise when the contract is legally enforced. The disappointed party
will frequently contend that the content of the contract, as ultimately
interpreted, does not accurately describe the original intent or
expectation.
Many such complaints about the misformulation or misinterpreta-
tion of an agreement are rooted in tensions between implied and express
terms and between standard and unconventional forms of expression. To
the extent that these tensions have been understood at all, the major at-
tempt to harmonize them relies on what we term the Expanded Choice
postulate.2 The postulate maintains that implied terms expand contrac-
tors' choices by providing standardized and widely suitable "preformula-
tions,"3 thus eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the
proposed arrangement. This Expanded Choice thesis implicitly
presumes a neutral policy toward individualized agreements: atypical
parties lose nothing, since they remain unrestrained from designing cus-
tomized provisions to replace the state-supplied terms.4
1. To formulate is "to reduce or to express in or as if in a formula; put into a systematized
statement or expression." WEB TER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 894 (1976).
2. A form of the Expanded Choice postulate has long been recognized as a normative princi-
ple in theoretical welfare economics. See Lancaster, Welfare Propositions in Terms of Consistency
and Expanded Choice, 68 ECON. J. 464 (1959).
3. The terminology of "preformulated" versus "particularized" contractual provisions fol-
lows our earlier discussion in Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 9-10. Candor requires us to admit that we bear a large
responsibility for the perhaps overly uncritical formalization of the Expanded Choice postulate. See,
eg., Goetz & Scott, supra note 3, at 971; Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1089-90 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts); Goetz & Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 588 n.87 (1977). However, a
number of other scholars must share the responsibility for the current popularity of the postulate as
a normative criterion. See, eg., A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 19-23 (1982); Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1249-52 (1982); Jackson, "Anticipatory
Repudiation" and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Dam.
ages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1978); Jackson & Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979). Professor Kronman
has even attempted to justify the postulate in Kantian terms rather than on purely utilitarian
grounds. See Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227
(1980). But see'A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTr, supra, at 21 n. 11. The only challenge to the almost
universal acceptance of the underlying assumption of neutrality that supports the Expanded Choice
postulate appears id, at 335-37.
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Despite the seductive persuasiveness of the Expanded Choice postu-
late, its reassurances are marred by unacknowledged incongruities. For
example, the courts' tendency to treat state-created rules as presump-
tively fair often leads to judicial disapproval of efforts to vary standard
implied terms by agreement.5 Indeed, as the system for implying terms
into contracts becomes more highly refined, the opting-out burden of
those who prefer a different allocation of risks grows weightier.6 Fur-
thermore, conflicting applications of the parol evidence and plain-mean-
ing rules betray widespread judicial uncertainty over the proper method
of interpreting agreements that intermingle express and implied terms.7
These and other related problems have exposed a central question that
remains unresolved: To what extent do implied and express terms, and
standardized and individualized forms of agreement, function in antago-
nistic rather than complementary ways? This issue can be illuminated by
focusing attention on the environment in which contractual formulations
evolve.
Part I of this Article develops a conceptual analysis of the interac-
tion between private and state-supplied contractual formulations. Our
framework departs from the conventional view that state-supplied con-
tract clauses are means merely of reducing negotiating and other re-
source costs; it focuses instead on the value of implied terms as widely
useful, predefined signals that reduce the incidence of certain identifiable
types of formulation errors. From this perspective, privately provided
express terms constitute more refined attempts to reduce the definitional
errors resulting from inappropriate formulations. We show how such
express signals are, paradoxically, so vulnerable to misinterpretation that
they may actually increase error. Contracting parties, therefore, must
rely on the state's standardization of express and implied terms in order
more safely to combine implied and express terms in their agreements.
This error-reduction conceptualization clarifies the ways in which formu-
lation errors occur, how private parties and courts react to them, and
how the state can and does influence the formulation of private contract
terms.
Part II examines the theoretical implications of this analysis for the
Expanded Choice postulate. We argue that the very benefits of the
state's efforts to imply and standardize widely useful terms create hith-
5. See, eg., Hayward v. Postma, 31 Mich. App. 720, 724, 188 N.W.2d 31, 33 (1971) (parties
must use clear and unequivocal language to shift liability for risk of loss from seller to buyer); Caudle
v. Sherrard Motors Co., 525 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (same); see also Davis v. Small
Business Inv. Co., 535 S.W.2d 740, 744 (rex. Civ. App. 1976) (contractual provision purporting to
allocate to debtor the burden of "all" expenses incurred in preserving collateral not an agreement
"otherwise" sufficient to vary the terms of U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(a)).
6. See infra notes 14, 19, & text accompanying notes 74-77.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 118-27.
1985]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
erto overlooked barriers to innovative forms of contractual agreement.
As more complex and refined terms are implied from the patterned be-
havior of contracting parties, variation by express agreement becomes
more difficult and costly than is commonly realized. Similarly, ex-
panding the set of standard terms and clauses retards the evolution of
new, "emergent" formulations. These barriers to innovation restrain the
development of alternative contractual formulations and favor highly re-
liable but possibly ill-fitting language, thereby imposing added costs on
innovative relationships.
We consider the normative implications of our analysis for contrac-
tual interpretation in Part III. The error-reduction framework demon-
strates that the prevailing judicial approach to ex post interpretation has
far-reaching feedback effects on the operation of the ex ante contractual
signalling system. Moreover, an examination of recent cases challenges
the conventional premise that methods of contractual interpretation have
evolved over the past half-century from an extreme focus on narrow
"plain meaning" to the opposite pole of liberal contextual construction.
Surprisingly, the cases reveal a continuing struggle between "textualist"
and "contextualist" interpretive methodologies. Depending upon which
methodology they favor, courts and commentators view the purpose of
contract interpretation as a determination either of what the contracting
parties subjectively intended or of what the contract itself objectively
means. We argue that this struggle between methodological extremes
reflects a failure to understand and accommodate the respective roles of
implied and express terms in contractual formulations. Properly under-
stood, the tensions between these competing methodologies can be allevi-
ated through interpretive principles designed explicitly to facilitate
improvements in contractual formulation. Finally, we suggest modifica-
tions in the interpretive process to better accommodate the complex and
demanding formulations required by specialized modem contractual
relationships.
I
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN IMPLIED
AND EXPRESS FORMULATIONS
What the law calls a "contract" starts out as a communication: an
exchange of promises between the parties. As we have emphasized else-
where, a key function of any promise is to provide information about a
future happening.' The content of that information, in turn, has a criti-
cal impact both on promissory reliance and on any subsequent interpre-
8. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J.
1261, 1266-70 (1980).
[Vol. 73:261
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tation of the contract by the state. Thus, a failure adequately to
communicate the content of a promise or to define the rights being ex-
changed threatens "reliability," the central concern of the contractual
process.
The analysis developed below will identify a variety of conceptually
distinct errors which reduce the reliability of contractual formulations as
instruments of communication and definition. Both the actions of the
state in promoting the development of standard formulations and those
of private parties in crafting express terms can then be recognized as ef-
forts to describe more accurately the rights being exchanged, in order to
reduce the risk of particular types of formulation error. Unfortunately,
the antagonistic relationship between the processes of generalization and
particularization makes it difficult to reduce one type of error without
aggravating another type.
A. The Costs of Contractual Formulation
L The Risk of Formulation Error
This paper assumes that the parties are able to negotiate to a subjec-
tive understanding about the combinations of underlying substantive
rights that form the basis for mutually beneficial trade. What remains is
an instrumental problem, that of formulating contractual terms that mir-
ror the desired exchange. Conventional analysis tends to regard the costs
of formulating contracts too narrowly, as including only "transaction
costs": those resource-oriented costs of time, effort, and expertise ex-
pended in the negotiation and drafting of agreements. But the formula-
tions of the agreement must also serve an evidentiary function, i.e., must
communicate the content of the agreement to nonparties, particularly
courts. Consequently, the formulation process entails risk above and be-
yond the resource costs of drafting the agreement. To understand the
formulation problem adequately, therefore, we must adopt a wider per-
spective on costs, one that incorporates the "error costs" resulting both
from unexploited opportunities and from unintended resort to state inter-
pretations of disputed contracts. Contractual formulations are, after all,
instruments designed to achieve particular purposes. More complex and
finely calibrated instruments generally offer improved results. Unfortu-
nately, intricate, special-purpose instruments may also invite disaster if
put to unintended uses, or if the instruments themselves have been inade-
quately designed and tested.
The risk of formulation error is thus a real cost of contracting
which, especially for certain classes of transactions, may be quite sub-
stantial.9 There are a number of ways parties might respond to this risk
9. The aggregate costs of contracting thus include not only the direct or out-of-pocket costs of
1985]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
in the absence of any assistance from the state. For instance, they could
invest resources to craft their contractual language with greater care and
expertise, so that unintended effects are minimized. Alternatively, they
might simply avoid transactions whose complexity makes adequate for-
mulation of performance obligations particularly difficult. Similarly, par-
ties could adopt relatively safe contractual formulations, even when
riskier ones would better fit their objectives. And, of course, parties
could simply choose to suffer the risks of formulation error when the
available alternatives are not cost-effective.
Contemporary contract law provides two mechanisms that, singly
or in combination, are thought to enable contracting parties to reduce
formulation error beyond what the methods described above permit.
First, the law supplies standardized and widely suitable risk allocations
which enable parties to take an implied formulation "off the rack," thus
eliminating certain types of costs and errors arising from individualized
specification of terms. Second, atypical parties are invited to formulate
express provisions that redesign or replace ill-fitting implied rules. Thus,
state-supplied terms provide parties with time-tested, relatively safe pro-
visions that minimize the risk of unintended effects. The danger that
state-supplied terms may fit the agreement imprecisely and distort its
meaning can be reduced by exercising the option to specify more pre-
cise-but frequently riskier-express terms.
The Expanded Choice postulate asserts that these two mechanisms
function harmoniously: state-supplied formulations facilitate typical
transactions while making atypical ones no more difficult. But two key
suppositions underlie this notion of Expanded Choice: (1) that state-sup-
plied terms are mere facilitators, specifying terms that the parties could
formulate themselves if unrestrained by time and effort costs; (2) that the
availability of state-supplied terms is neutral in that it raises no barriers
beyond the existing resource costs to the use of alternative terms by atyp-
ical parties. In order to test the validity of these suppositions, imagine
that parties engaged in contract negotiations can at minimal resource
cost bargain over and draft any possible set of express formulations upon
which they may ultimately agree. Under these conditions, can the par-
ties put together combinations of implied and express provisions in a way
that fully captures their subjective understanding? We begin our analysis
of this question by identifying some considerations that affect the choice
of contractual formulations.
negotiation, drafting, and the like, but also the effects of "error": the social costs that arise when the
contractual provision fails to resolve correctly an anticipated contingency. Furthermore, contracting
parties can be expected to invest in precautionary measures, such as alternative formulations, up to
the point where such precautionary expenditures equal the expected cost of formulation error.
[Vol. 73:261
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2. The Communication and Definition Functions of Contracts
To the extent that the law permits parties to choose from an array of
alternative formulations, it also allows the parties to make mistakes in
those choices. In visualizing exactly how things can go wrong, it is help-
ful to view contracts essentially as collections of conditional instructions.
Contractual terms first communicate to the parties what consequences
are to occur if certain conditions are met and then, when those condi-
tions become actualities, define for the state the appropriate conse-
quences. Payments, delivery of goods, recourse to remedies, etc., are all
examples of consequences triggered by what are supposed to be well-de-
fined linkages to precipitating events or contingencies. If a particular set
of contingencies materializes, then the outcome should be predictable.
This is, of course, a formal way of capturing what the law regards as the
intent of the parties about the performance that is to follow when certain
conditions are met. If the instructions that make up contracts were ide-
ally formulated, then the only uncertainty associated with contractual
results would concern the probability of the contingencies themselves
and not the execution of the instructions. The agreement would then be
a legally defined and mutually communicated assignment of risks contin-
gent on future events. Such a complete contingent contract1" is the ideal
of contractual "reliability."
By contrast, formulation error is revealed when the occurrence of a
contingency produces surprising (and unintended) consequences, sug-
gesting that the instructions embedded in the contract are defective.11
These defects, in turn, may be failures of either the communication or
definition function of the contractual formulation. Whether the contract
is properly communicative depends critically on subjective perceptions of
the parties. While these subjective understandings are dispositive for the
overwhelming majority of contracts, the state's definitional powers may
override the communicative content in that fraction of contracts submit-
ted to external adjudication.
3. A Typology of Formulation Error
The first step in discussing responses to the risk of formulation error
is to understand precisely how the types of errors differ. For instance,
certain formulations are said to be "ambiguous," "indefinite," or the
10. The perfectly contingent contract is a paradigm in which parties in a bargaining situation
are presumed able, at reasonable cost, to allocate explicitly the risks that future contingencies may
cause one or the other to regret having entered into an executory agreement. Its polar opposite is the
"relational" contract, in which one or more future contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncer-
tain, thus preventing accurate allocation of risks at the time of contracting. See generally Goetz &
Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 4, at 1089-92.
11. Formulation error is revealed only when a disappointed party contends that a subsequent
interpretation of the contract deviates from the original expectation.
1985]
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product of "mistake." While such labels generally describe what can go
wrong, they are themselves imprecise. By building on the notions of
communicative and definitive functions just discussed, we can clarify the
different ways in which contractual signals may be defective. A more
careful typology of errors suggests that both the state and private parties
are responding to a number of conceptually distinct problems of contract
formulation.
a. Administrative Error
Perhaps the simplest form of formulation error is the accidental or
mechanical failure that results in omission or distortion of a clearly in-
tended formulation. For example, a written contract may be inaccu-
rately transcribed bi inadvertent omission of a clause or key words, or
misstatement of a price or date. Little elaboration is necessary about
such "administrative error." Administrative errors are usually easily rec-
ognizable although, alas, not always detected in time. 2
Any contractual device that simplifies the operations required to ex-
press a formulation also reduces the risk of administrative error. Hence,
a preprinted standard-form contract is advantageous in that the scope for
administrative errors is minimized. Better yet are preformulated terms,
which are never subject to purely administrative error: they are either
implied terms that need not be printed or legally conventionalized con-
tractual terms of art that may be expressly invoked by the parties. Both
are concise alternatives to wordy and error-prone individualized
formulations.
b. Ambiguity
The term "ambiguous" is loosely applied to describe a variety of
formulation difficulties. Our intention is to use the term more narrowly,
to focus on the precision of contractual terms. When a single instruction
has more than one possible meaning, the same set of factual conditions
may generate alternate sets of prescribed consequences. 13 When un-
12. Ordinarily, the "mistake" that produces an administrative error is readily recognizable,
i.e., "mutual." Thus, either party is entitled to have the written agreement reformed to express the
original intention, so long as third parties are not "unfairly affected." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTRAcrs § 504 illustration 1 (1932). The same result would occur under the Second Restate-
ment as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 (1979). The reformation remedy
is granted only after proof of a discrepancy between the parties' understanding and their written
expressions of it. Furthermore, the courts are reluctant to "make a new contract" for the parties,
and thus require that the discrepancy be established by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g.,
Progressive Mut. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 35 Mich. App. 633, 193 N.W.2d 54 (1971); Ross v. Food
Specialties, 6 N.Y.2d 336, 160 N.E.2d 618, 189 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1959).
13. Courts often do not distinguish between "vague" and "ambiguous" terms. A typical judi-
cial definition of ambiguity includes, for example, any term or word that is "capable of more than
one sensible and reasonable interpretation or has no definite significance," Ross Bros. Constr. Co, v.
[Vol. 73:261
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resolvable controversies arise over the meaning of "ambiguous" contrac-
tual language, the parties must resort to an external dispute-resolution
mechanism with its own criteria for interpretation.14
Ambiguity in contractual instructions is normally unintended, i.e., it
is surprising to the parties involved. In most instances, had the possibil-
ity of the dispute-triggering conditions been pointed out in advance, the
parties could have reformulated the terms so as to remove the ambigu-
ity-and would have preferred so to rectify the error. Focus on the unin-
tentional case has perhaps obscured the analysis of situations in which
the parties deliberately use vague or "indeterminate" formulations."5
State ex rel Transp. Comm'n, Highway Div., 59 Or. App. 374, 650 P.2d 1080 (1982). More nar-
rowly, however, a word is vague to the extent that it can apply to a wide spectrum of referents, or to
referents that cluster around a modal "best instance," or to somewhat different referents in different
people. See, eg., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) ("chicken" is stewing chicken, as seller contends, rather than the broiler or fryer chicken);
Highley v. Phillips, 176 Md. 463, 5 A.2d 824 (1939) (provision for removal of "all the dirt" on a
tract included sand from a stratum of subsoil). Linguistically, ambiguity requires at least two dis-
tinct, usually inconsistent meanings. See, eg., Petroleum Fin. Corp. v. Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312 (5th
Cir. 1957) (telegram lacking punctuation that would ordinarily be supplied in a letter permits differ-
ing readings); Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (the celebrated case of two ships
named "Peerless," sailing from Bombay several months apart). Most language is vague in the sense
that the set of objects to which a word applies is rarely delineated with absolute precision, but true
syntactic ambiguity occurs only infrequently. This distinction is sometimes expressed in terms of
"latent ambiguity" (the Peerless case) and "patent ambiguity" (uncertainty of meaning or vague-
ness). See, eg., W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 150 (18th ed. 1939); D. Mc-
DONNELL & J. MOORE, KERR ON FRAUD AND MISTAKE 171 (7th ed. 1952). Professor Young
suggested substituting "equivocation" for patent ambiguity since it "was not yet burdened with legal
siguification." Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 619, 626-34
(1964). Regardless of the label used, the distinction is relevant to our separate discussion, in the text
below, of "indeterminate" instructions. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60.
14. Courts do perform this function, but their use of interpretive criteria is problematic. For
instance, uncertainty persists over the relative weight to be given the "plain meaning" of the parties'
express language and various types of contextual evidence that qualify or alter the "ordinary" mean-
ing of the express terms. Hence, parties face some uncertainty about the applicable criteria for
resolving ambiguity. Compare In re Soper's Estate, 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935) (extrinsic
evidence admissible to show that the word "wife" did not refer to deceased's legal wife but to woman
with whom he was living at death), with Dixon, Odom & Co. v. Sledge, 59 N.C. App. 280, 296
S.E.2d 512 (1982) (extrinsic evidence not admissible to establish that "former client" in separation
agreement did not include a client who had previously left the firm before approaching the with-
drawing partner). The sources of (and solutions for) this current confusion over interpretive criteria
are analyzed in Part III below. See also infra note 19 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 151-60. Terms may deliberately be left ambiguous or
imprecise as a "lesser of evils" expedient. In relational contexts, for example, parties may agree to
use "best efforts" or behave "reasonably" or act in "good faith" because they are incapable of antici-
pating-much less resolving-all future contingencies. Here, what is being called for is not interpre-
tation of the particular terms, but equitable "filling in of the blanks" in light of conditions that were
difficult to anticipate or describe in advance. See, eg., C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 208
(1944) ("[O]ne of the chief functions of [imprecise] words is that they can be adapted to this or that
specific purpose, as occasion requires."). This "adapter" need not, of course, be a court of law. An
arbitrator may offer specialized expertise or more sensible dispute-resolution criteria than a state-
supplied judge. Properly speaking, of course, such indeterminate instructions should be described as
deliberately "vague" rather than "ambiguous." See supra note 13.
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c. Incompleteness
When a contract fails to provide for a contingency, unintended re-
sults may occur. This "incompleteness error" typically occurs when the
parties inadvertently overlook a potentially important, but low
probability contingency. 16 Incompleteness errors in contracts are analo-
gous to "bugs" in computer software: the program functions correctly
until it encounters an unanticipated combination of operational condi-
tions. The sudden popularity of CB radios in the mid-1970s, for in-
stance, revealed a "bug" in many automobile insurance policies.
Expensive and vulnerable add-on automotive equipment, such as stereo
players, had been excluded from coverage, but the policy language did
not anticipate CB units. Insurance companies were forced to cover the
unforeseen risk until the "bug" could be fixed at the next cycle of policy
renewals. Note that contractual instructions, although incomplete, may
nonetheless specify a perfectly well-defined and clear result for each con-
tingency, as in the example of the insurance companies who were bound
to pay for stolen CB equipment. If the possibility of some contingency
was not foreseen at the formulation stage, however, the resulting assign-
ment of consequences will nonetheless be unintended and surprise at
least one of the parties.
Incompleteness is not inevitable even when the express instructions
of the parties fail to allow for a particular contingency. Parties implicitly
incorporate the standard rules of contract law into their agreement. In-
deed, a key purpose of state-supplied terms is to save parties from the
necessity of formulating a complete set of express conditions for contin-
gencies that may be difficult to anticipate, or are at least easily over-
looked. Thus, many of the general rules of contract, such as those of
impossibility and excuse, impose constructive conditions that reduce in-
completeness risks. 7 These supplementary rules of contract do not re-
16. Errors caused by incomplete instructions are frequently manifested by a claimed excuse
from a contractual obligation because of mistake of fact or impracticability. For example, compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 152 (1979) (When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a
Contract Voidable), with id. § 266 (Existing Impracticability or Frustration). Illustrative cases in-
lude Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363 (1974)
(failure to provide for labor dispute); Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (failure to provide for the
illness of King Edward VII); Howell v. Coupland, [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 258 (failure to provide for crop
failure). In general, courts will complete the instructions with a preformulated legal norm whenever
the contingency in question was reasonably foreseeable.
17. See generally Young, supra note 13. The standard gap-filling or supplementary role of
contract rules is well established in the common law. Holmes, for example, offers the illustration of
the lecturer who agrees to speak without mentioning the time: "One of the parties thinks that the
promise will be construed to mean at once, within a week. The other thinks that it means when he is
ready." Holmes resolved this "incompleteness" problem by affirming the contract, the lecturer to
appear in a reasonable time. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897).
[Vol. 73:261
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move all incompleteness, however; they are necessarily generalized
formulations that do not purport to address every set of circumstances.
d. Inconsistency
Inconsistency errors occur when a contract contains separate in-
structions that arguably compel conflicting results for the same set of
conditions. Whereas incompleteness errors are the result of under-
providing contractual instructions, inconsistent terms are a result of
overprovision. In one illustrative case, for example, inconsistency existed
between the alleged understandings that unloading and storage charges
were to be paid by the buyer and an "F.A.S." term which normally indi-
cates that the seller pays."8 Although the courts and parties may attempt
to resolve the apparent logical contradiction by asserting ambiguity, that
label is frequently a misnomer. Especially when the conflict is between
express and implied terms, framing the problem as one of inconsistency
is more helpful at raising the underlying issues, which involve competing
priorities or hierarchies of rules rather than "meanings" of terms.19
e. Interpretation Error
When their own communication errors cause the parties to under-
stand their agreement in diverse ways, the state's subsequent defining of
the disputed terms will necessarily conflict with at least one party's in-
tent. In addition to such errors precipitated by the parties themselves,
the state may in effect superimpose new and thus "erroneous" instruc-
tions on an original formulation that was well understood between the
parties but disputed for strategic motives. Such errors will occur when
the court either enforces terms that were almost certainly not contem-
plated by either party or refuses to enforce terms that were. Cases that
have implied a warranty of habitability into residential leases are fre-
quently cited as examples of the former variety of error,20 while cases
that have refused to acknowledge the enforceability of requirements and
18. Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980) (evidence of
course of performance admissible to vary standard meaning of F.A.S. term in written contract).
19. Disputes over arguably inconsistent terms often center on the appropriate interpretation of
Uniform Commercial Code sections 1-205(4) and 2-202, which address apparent conflicts between
express terms and usages of trade, courses of dealing, and other context evidence. Although both
provisions purport to favor express terms in cases of conflict, the cases betray substantial variance.
Eg., compare Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (usage controls),
with Southern Concrete Servs. Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(express term controls), aftd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the relationship
between express terms and the contractual context, see Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing:
Subversion of the U.C. Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811.
20. See Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 384 A.2d 1234 (1978), affid, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d
897 (1979).
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best-efforts contracts are illustrations of the latter.21
Some instances of imposed error reflect deliberate substitutions of
the state's will for that of the parties. More frequently, however, the
state creates "interpretation error" by inadvertently failing to extract the
"correct" meaning from the signals that the parties have given. Indeed,
the inherent fallibility of the interpretive process generates an irreducible
risk of error. In recent years, courts have vacillated between an extreme
interpretive focus on narrow "plain meaning" and the opposite norm of
loose contextual construction.22 Regardless of the mode of contractual
interpretation adopted by the state, ex post interventions that seek to
accommodate both express and implied formulations threaten instead to
redefine dramatically the nature of the bargain.23
f Ill-Fitting Formulations
The brief descriptions of the foregoing categories may already have
suggested that there will frequently be practical tradeoffs among the dif-
ferent categories of formulation error. Indeed, if the desired substantive
exchange of the parties is sufficiently difficult to formulate, and the
residual risk of error sufficiently high, one risk-reducing strategy is to
rely on "ill-fitting" formulations that admittedly do not produce the de-
sired exchange. Thus, parties may adapt to a risky environment by using
safe but inexact formulations.24 When this occurs, the potential gains
from trade are not fully exploited.
We can now state concisely the central premise of our conceptual
framework: We assume that contracting parties attempt to minimize the
aggregate costs of coping with the various types of formulation errors
described above.25 In selecting suitable instruments to accomplish this
objective, the contractors face two pivotal choices: first, whether to rely
on implied or express formulations; and second, whether to accept stan-
dardized formulations or attempt to design unconventional alternatives.
Unfortunately, as the following sections will show, these formulation
21. See, eg., Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 111. 215, 98 N.E. 263
(1912); Bay v. Bedwell, 21 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 118-27.
23. See infra cases cited in note 78 and accompanying discussion.
24. A classic example of the use of ill-fitting formulations is the adoption of admittedly over-
broad warranty disclaimers by many sellers of computer software. In a published letter to a trade
magazine, the president of Signature Software Systems acknowledged that the firm in fact was will-
ing to-and de facto did-guarantee the efficacy of its programs to users, but nevertheless used a
particular broad-based warranty disclaimer and licensing form because it had been previously jiti-
gated by another firm and thus definitively interpreted by a court. Otten, Warranty Pirates, BYTE,
Mar. 1983, at 22 (letter to editors). This phenomenon is elaborated infra in text accompanying note
83.
25. Of course, aggregate costs include the resource costs of drafting, negotiation, and the like.
We contend, however, that these costs are relatively insignificant in comparison to the costs of error.
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mechanisms affect the different types of errors in potentially conflicting
ways.
B. The Function of Implied Formulations
L The Expanding Sources of Implied Terms
Until recently, the state had a relatively restrained role in develop-
ing contractual formulations. The traditional common law interpretive
approach, as reflected in the parol evidence and plain-meaning rules, fo-
cused intensively on the written agreement.26 If the writing appeared to
be a complete (integrated) expression of the parties' intent, the common
law parol evidence rule barred introduction of extrinsic evidence to con-
tradict or supplement the written terms. The rule thus fixed the inte-
grated document as the sole subject for interpretation.27 Only the limited
set of judicially or legislatively recognized rules of contract law would be
automatically incorporated into the agreement, and only such of them as
were not preempted by the express terms.28 In addition, the traditional
plain-meaning rule barred parties from using extrinsic evidence to aid
interpretation: if the document appeared clear and unambiguous in its
terms, its meaning was to be determined from the four corners of the
instrument, without resort to extrinsic evidence.29
The common law rules thus strained mightily to avoid confronting
many of the sources of formulation error just described, relying on the
26. See Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLOM. L. REV. 860, 862-64
(1968); see also Henrietta Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1931) ("The courts
will not write contracts for the parties to them nor construe them other than in accordance with the
plain and literal meaning of the language used."). As we discuss infra in Part III, this traditional
view continues to have loyal adherents. See, eg., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Capital Cities Com-
munications, Inc., 301 Pa. Super. 557, 570, 448 A.2d 48, 54 (1982) ("[No extrinsic evidence may be
introduced in an attempt actually to alter, amend, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract
as written.").
27. See, e.g., Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 381, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (1928) (in order for
evidence of a prior oral agreement to be admissible, "an inspection of the written contract, read in
the light of surrounding circumstances must not indicate that the writing appears 'to contain the
engagements of the parties' "); RESTATEMENT op CoNTRACTs § 237 (1932) (Parol Evidence Rule);
see also Board of Trade v. Swiss Credit Bank, 597 F.2d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1979) (ambiguity is
necessary to admission of usage evidence). This case is but one example of the continuing influence
of the traditional common law approach. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
28. See, eg., Smith v. Abel, 211 Or. 571, 593, 316 P.2d 793, 803-04 (1957) ("While custom (if
sufficiently shown) might be used to interpret an ambiguous term of the contract, it could not be
used to make a contract or to add to or contradict the terms of the contract.").
29. See McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings, 31 CALIF. L. Rav.
145 (1943). As we discuss below, despite the endorsement of expansive resort to context in the Code
and Second Restatement, the plain-meaning rule continues to be invoked by many courts in order to
bar the use of extrinsic evidence in interpretation. This tension over appropriate methods of inter-
pretation symptomizes the continuing failure to appreciate the dynamics of contractual formulation.
See cases cited infra in notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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maxim "the courts do not make a contract for the parties."'3'  At least as
evidenced by the language of their written formulations, however, parties
frequently seemed to make very bad contracts for themselves. Pressure
mounted steadily to imply informal understandings and usages into con-
tracts.3 1 The dam, which had begun to leak earlier in the twentieth cen-
tury, finally burst with the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the triumph of a dramatically changed, activist approach that has come
to permeate other aspects of contract law as well. 2
The Code, now joined by the Second Restatement of Contracts, ef-
fectively reverses the common law presumption that the parties' writing
and the official law of contract are the definitive elements of the agree-
ment. Evidence derived from experience and practice can now trigger
the incorporation of additional, implied terms. The Code, for example,
explicitly recognizes that the content of an agreement includes trade us-
ages, prior dealings and the parties' experience in the performance of the
contract. 3 Indeed, the parol evidence rule under the Code and the Sec-
ond Restatement admits inferences from trade usage, prior dealings, and
performance even if the express terms of the contract seem perfectly clear
and are apparently "integrated., 34 Once proven, privately generated im-
plied terms are accorded essentially the same status as state-supplied offi-
cial formulations and must be explicitly preempted if they are not to
apply. 5
The Code thus implies as a state-supplied term any prevailing com-
mercial practice in any recognizable class of transactions; the prevalent
contractual patterns in a trade environment automatically become im-
30. See, eg., Agnew v. Lacey Co-Ply, 33 Wash. App. 283, 288, 654 P.2d 712, 715 (1982) ("A
court may not create a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves.").
31. See Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1102-04 (1965).
32. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979) (Supplying an Omitted
Essential Term); id. § 221 (Usage Supplementing an Agreement); id. § 222 (Usages of Trade); id.
§ 223 (Course of Dealing).
33. "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208)." U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978).
34. Comments to the Code state that:
This section definitely rejects. . . the requirement that a condition precedent to the admis-
sibility of [evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade or course of performance] is an
original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous. [§ 2-202(a)]
makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade and course of performance
to explain or supplement the terms of any writing stating the agreement of the parties in
order that the true understanding of the parties. . . may be reached.
U.C.C. § 2-202 comments 1, 2 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 220
comment d, § 222 comment b, § 223 comment b (1979).
35. "Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between
the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless
carefully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the words used." U.C.C. § 2-202
comment 2 (1978).
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plied formulations.36 Similarly, devices now exist for creating implied
formulations that are individualized to the parties. A course of dealing
between the parties,37 for example, establishes "a common basis of un-
derstanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."38 A
course of conduct after or under the agreement has similar significance.39
An inference drawn either from a course of dealing or from performance
under the present contract trumps an inconsistent trade usage. 40 The
primacy of the more individualized implied terms is based on the as-
sumption that the parties themselves know best what they meant by their
contractual formulations, and that their actions before and under the
agreement are the best indication of their meaning.
The process of implying terms from more narrowly focused experi-
ences places a significant stress on the state's interpretive process.
Whereas the court generally infers alleged industry-wide trade practices
36. The Code identifies the sources of unofficial (i.e., privately created) supplementary norms
in some detail. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978) ("A usage of trade is any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.").
Assuming that such usages can be shown to exist, what is the "jurisdiction" of these unofficial
preformulations? Under pre-Code law, a trade usage did not apply to a party who was not a member
of the trade unless he actually knew of it or the other party could reasonably believe he knew of it.
White and Summers observe that
[t]his view has been carried forward by § 1-205(3).. .. [Ulsage of trade is only binding on
members of the trade involved or persons who know or should know about it. Persons
who should be aware of a trade usage doubtless include those who regularly deal with
members of the relevant trade, and also members of a second trade who commonly deal
with members of the relevant trade (for example, farmers should know something of farm
equipment selling).
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 12-7, at 457 (2d ed. 1980).
But the same commentators also note that requirements for proving a usage are "far less strin-
gent" than were the old common law requirements for custom. A usage of trade need not be well-
known, let alone universal, if it is sufficiently regular that the factfinder can draw an inference that
the parties would expect it to be observed. Id. § 3-3, at 103; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs
§ 247 comment b (1932); 5 S. WILLISroN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 661, at 113-
18 (3d ed. 1961); Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an
Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 515, 574-75 (1981).
37. A course of dealing is "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction." U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1978).
38. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1) (1979) (same language).
Unless "carefully negated," the course of prior dealings between the parties becomes a fully opera-
tive element of the parties' agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(2) comment b (1979) (same). Indeed, course of dealing is attributed
greater weight than usage of trade, since dealings evidence arrangements between the two parties to
the contract. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b)
(1979) (same). The relevance of individualized context was, of course, recognized prior to the Code
and Second Restatement. See, eg., 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 555-556 (1963); 5 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 36, § 660.
39. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 2 (1978).
40. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) & comment 1 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 203(b) (1979) (same).
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from a considerable mass of behavioral data, the alleged patterns in the
behavior of particular parties may be derived from a quite limited
number of occurrences. The number of observations may be so small
that an observer would have difficulty distinguishing valid inferences
from spurious ones. Courts experience grave difficulty determining the
degree of repetition necessary to establish a "course" of conduct.4 Simi-
larly, it may be difficult to determine whether a particular act sheds light
on the ex ante meaning of the agreement or merely represents an ex post
waiver of a term of the agreement. The finder of fact must engage in an
error-prone inquiry whether the acts were ambiguous and, if not,
whether they constitute a course of performance or waivers-unpat-
terned instances from which no inferences can be drawn.42
A number of courts have recognized informal commercial practices
in the course of interpreting disputed contracts. However, the tide of
expansive implication has not swept away the restrained approach of the
common-law tradition. The two systems, continuing in an uneasy coex-
istence, provide an opportunity to study how changes in the supply of
implied terms affect the risks of formulation errors.
2. The Effects of Expanding the Supply of Implied Terms
a. Customs and Usages: Reducing Error from Ill-Fitting Formulations
Many provisions of executory contracts are commonly implied from
standard state-supplied rules of contract, such as the rules specifying the
detail and standard of performance, the remedies for nonperformance, or
the unforeseen contingencies which will excuse further obligation. These
standard rules are designed for general application; they are often incon-
gruent with the shifting needs of various classes of specialized contrac-
tors.43 Because they evolve slowly, official rules necessarily lag behind
the emergence of new conditions, resulting in increasingly ill-fitting for-
mulations. By implying a variety of terms derived from the general com-
41. Although the Code requires more than a single instance ("A single occasion of conduct
does not fall within the language of this section"), it supplies no further guidance on how many acts
are needed. U.C.C. § 2-208 comment 4 (1978).
42. While the Code does express a preference for the waiver interpretation, this preference
operates only if the interpretation is doubtful. If this problem arises, "the preference is in favor of
'waiver' whenever such construction, plus the application of the provisions on the reinstatement of
rights waived. . . is needed to preserve the flexible character of commercial contracts and to pre-
vent surprise or other hardship." Id. comment 3 (1978).
43. To be sure, when the state perceives the needs of such contractors as sufficiently important,
it may adopt special purpose rules for particular subsets of transactions. For example, for the cases
of personal services, sales, government contracts, and construction projects, the state has provided
specialized rules that supplement or replace the standard formulations. But the judicial and legisla-
tive processes by which such special-purpose rules evolve tend to be relatively slow and to operate
only for fairly general subsets of transactions.
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mercial environment, the state expands the supply of widely useful,
standard forms of agreement. These include, for example, trade usages
regarding the existence of warranties,' commonly accepted quality toler-
ances,45 and circumstances under which price and quantity terms that
appear to be fixed are in fact subject to some variation.4 6 These "custom-
ary" formulations serve as general standards for particular sets of trans-
actions, thus reducing the error caused by reliance on ill-fitting official
formulations.
Custom and usages are, in effect, an additional set of general pat-
terns, reflecting a collective wisdom and experience about certain special-
ized understandings. These patterns are "prototypes" in both of the
traditional senses of that word: more importantly as archetypes, models
or patterns; but also as temporal precursors to possible formal legal "rec-
ognition."'47 Patterns that gain acceptance within a particular market or
sub-market will ultimately emerge as additions to the array of state-sup-
plied terms. Legal recognition will occur, for instance, when a court
holds a relevant trade practice to be a controlling factor in an interpreta-
44. A typical example is the obligation to provide pedigree papers in contracts for sale of
purebred animals. Under § 2-314(3) of the Code, such a usage or course of dealing concerning the
standard of quality of goods sold creates an implied warranty that supplements the "official" implied
warranty of merchantability. Just as with legislatively supplied terms, such a warranty automati-
cally becomes part of the contract unless properly disclaimed. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 3 (1978).
45. See, eg., Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 190 N.W.2d 275
(1971) (trade usage that "commercial quality" steel requires a carbon content between 1010 and
1020).
46. See, eg., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (usage and
course of dealing admitted to show that express price and quantity terms were not exact, but projec-
tions to be adjusted according to market forces). But cf Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton
Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (evidence of trade usage to modify quantity
term in integrated writing excluded by court under parol evidence rule), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir. 1978).
47. Unlike legal rules that are implied unless specifically countermanded, private prototypes
must be incorporated, formally or informally, into the agreement by the parties. Formal incorpora-
tion occurs when parties make a particular pattern an express part of their writing. Informal proto-
types are mere tacit understandings and are not explicitly expressed. An important feature of such
informally adopted contractual patterns is that they normally lack legal enforceability unless the
state provides a recognition mechanism. Of course, lack of legal enforceability does not necessarily
prevent informal terms from heavily influencing their commercial environments. In fact, the pri-
macy of such informal norms gives currency to the widely held view that the express terms of a
commercial contract "don't matter," since the parties appear constrained almost entirely by custom
and usage. An alternative characterization of such contracts is that the express terms are merely
relatively insignificant in comparison to those implied. "Ordinary" contractors in such markets can
reasonably begin each transaction with the assurance that the mere indication of intention to create a
legal relationship will trigger the imposition of standards common to the industry or trade.
Professor MaeCauley is the most notable champion of the view that commercial relationships
are largely governed by "social," as distinct from "legal" norms. See MacCauley, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); see also Klein & Leffier,
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). We
would argue, of course, that the distinction is largely illusory. The unofficial or other context-gener-
ated understandings might be legally enforceable, implied terms.
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tion dispute. Thereafter, the trade usage will constitute an implied term
for all transactions within the relevant category. a This evolutionary
process produces an expanding supply of mature, customary formula-
tions that individual parties could not replicate merely by the expendi-
ture of additional time and effort. For most parties, such implied terms
are not only cheaper, but they are also better than do-it-yourself ones.
The expanded menu of customary implied terms thus allows more
parties to choose contractual formulations that closely fit their ideal
transactional relationship. Furthermore, despite the distinctive benefits
of customary formulations, there are several reasons why private con-
tracting parties would be hesitant to develop such formulations them-
selves. First, parties who develop innovative forms bear significant,
exogenous, legal risks. Since the legal system retains ultimate power over
interpretation and enforcement, parties cannot be certain what effect will
be given to any formulation until it is tested.49 Second, the process of
contractual formulation is subject to inherent endogenous hazards that
emerge and undergo correction only over time. Accumulated experi-
ences are therefore very important in shaping customary contractual
prototypes.
Formulations that survive this quasi-Darwinian evolutionary pro-
cess become mature conventions whose risks and performance character-
istics are known. A new or emerging formulation is risky because it has
not been sufficiently tested for various types of formulation errors. A
celebrated example of the hazards of immature conventions is Frigali-
ment Importing Co. v. B.M.S. International Sales Corp."0 That case in-
48. Importing usages and dealings into a contract provides a means of giving recognized legal
status to sets of privately provided, special-purpose formulations having limited "jurisdiction."
Courts are directed to infer these rules from the patterned behavior of types of traders and of individ-
ual parties. Whatever its practical difficulties, this inquiry falls within the traditional realm ofjudi-
cial factfinding. A different problem arises once a usage has been established. Thereafter, its
underlying rationale-and therefore its proper application to any particular set of circumstances-
may be misunderstood.
It is well-settled that application of the official rules of contract to the particular facts of a case
is a "matter of law" to be undertaken by the judge. This includes the application of basic principles
of interpretation to the evidence as well. See, eg., Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. State ex rel Transp.
Comm'n, Highway Div., 59 Or. App. 374, 650 P.2d 1080 (1982) (threshold determination of ambi-
guity remains a legal question for the court). The rationale for this rule is plain. The correct appli-
cation of black-letter law is a matter of some sophistication, requiring knowledge of the underlying
purposes of the rules and their manner of interaction. Traditionally, therefore, many matters of rule
application were withheld from the jury.
Little attention has been paid, however, to the problem of construing unofficial rules. The Code
dictates that "[i]f it is established that. . . a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar
writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978). Exactly who
may construe an unwritten trade usage or other "unofficial" norm is, however, an open question.
49. It is this interpretive risk that provides the key link between the development of contrac-
tual formulations and contractual interpretation.
50. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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volved an apparently straightforward attempt to formulate a contract for
several hundred thousand pounds of chicken using a combination of ex-
press terms and emerging trade patterns. Although some of the defining
patterns used were mature, and therefore reliable, the tentative status of
others rendered the precise definition of "chicken" uncertain.51 As Fri-
galiment illustrates, the production of well-validated, mature formula-
tions is a costly, error-prone process.
b. Courses of Dealing and Performance: Reducing Incompleteness
Error
In addition to incorporating broadly based contextual patterns, the
state may also import into the legal agreement particularized exper-
iences, such as courses of dealing or performance. This additional aspect
of the implication process reduces those formulation errors caused by
recourse to express contractual signals. Implying particularized terms
avoids the administrative errors and the ambiguities in expression that
frequently result when understandings are reduced to express terms.
Moreover, a course of dealing or performance also reduces what we have
described as incompleteness error. Many low-probability contingencies
are unlikely to be addressed expressly in typical executory contracts.
These events are too uncertain, and their interaction too complex, for
individual bargainers to provide for them by express contractual terms.
But repeated experience with low-probability events tends to reveal pat-
terns of behavior between the parties. When the transactions between
parties involve repeated occasions for performance, courts can look to
these highly focused experiences as a source of implied terms in subse-
quent interpretive disputes between the same parties. By increasing the
supply of party-specific terms, the state thus promotes reductions in in-
completeness risks.
3. Underlying Tensions in the Implication Process
The various aspects of the implication process are not wholly com-
plementary. Indeed, there is an inherent tension between the expansive
incorporation of the particularized contractual context and the evolution
of customary formulations that are widely useful for many contractors.
The incorporation of party-specific context may reduce the risk of incom-
pleteness error, but it also retards the adaptive evolution of the custom
51. There exist well-established categories of chickens such as "broilers," "roasters," "fryers,"
and "stewing chicken." The problem was whether the generic word "chicken" was used in the
agreement to embrace all of these categories, as the seller contended, or, as the buyer argued, to
exclude stewing chicken, which it referred to as "fowl." Reference to usage--common trade under-
standings as well as courses of dealing and performance between the parties-was insufficient to
satisfy the buyer's burden of proof.
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and usage formulations that would otherwise emerge as prevalent con-
tractual norms. In order for a customary formulation to evolve, it must
become widely acceptable as a standard form of agreement. Highly spec-
ified and particularized formulations, implied from the narrowly focused
evidence of courses of performance and dealing, undercut the appeal of
general-purpose formulations designed for broad categories of transac-
tions. Since parties will have less frequent recourse to widely used proto-
types if the implication process becomes more particularized, the
recognition of customary terms having general efficacy will necessarily
decline.
Conversely, an expanded supply of customary terms tends to under-
mine the reliability of the more specialized implied terms derived from
courses of dealing and performance. The risk of interpretation error in-
creases if the decisionmaker must rationalize individualized terms with
customary contractual norms. This interpretive tension results in incon-
sistencies between contractual signals and thus generates offsetting costs.
The precise empirical effects of expanding the implication process
remain uncertain. But when the state attempts to minimize the costs of
formulation error by providing contractors with a complete array of im-
plied terms, there is a tradeoff between different types of error as the
implication process is extended to include both generalized and particu-
larized experiences. Customary terms reduce the distortion from ill-fit-
ting formulations but expose parties to incompleteness risks. Conversely,
more particularized terms will reduce incompleteness error but at the
cost of a reduced supply of mature, customary formulations. To be sure,
there are initial gains in error reduction generated by a wider array of
implied terms. But the generalized/particularized tradeoff suggests that,
beyond a point, further state intervention is unlikely to yield cost-effec-
tive reductions in formulation error. Since the various types of error are
sensitive to different, potentially conflicting influences, there is a practical
limitation on the capacity of implied terms to reduce error costs.
Assume that contracting parties have incorporated the optimal com-
bination of particularized and customary implied terms. In a world
without resource constraints, can they effect any further reductions in
aggregate error? The Expanded Choice postulate suggests an affirmative
answer in theory: parties can alter the state-supplied structure by negoti-
ating additional express terms. They will do so whenever the offsetting
effects of implication threaten to limit the benefits of using implied terms.
We shall argue, however, that combining express and implied terms
raises a number of formidable practical difficulties.
C. The Function of Express Formulations
Given the inability of even the most elaborate state implication of
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terms fully to eliminate formulation error, the freedom to disclaim or
supplement any state-supplied term seems to offer contracting parties an
attractive option. An express agreement enables the parties to signal
some combination of supplements or replacements for the implied terms
that the law would otherwise impute to the contract. Unhappily, this
additional signalling or communication necessarily involves verbal or
written symbols that are susceptible to misinterpretation.
1. Express Options: Supplementing and Trumping
Express formulations offer two distinct options for using particular-
ized instructions to enhance a framework of implied terms. The first of
these enables one to augment or supplement the implied terms ("opting
in"). Some supplementary terms are indispensable for each transaction,
if only to indicate price, identify goods, or supply similar rudimentary
detail. Additionally, supplementary terms may add to and refine the
state-supplied terms, explicitly allocating whatever risks of intervening
contingencies are incompletely signalled by the array of implied terms.
Since supplementary terms address the risks of incomplete agreement,
their defining characteristic is that they are not inconsistent with the un-
derlying structure of the state-supplied terms. By contrast, parties some-
times desire to countermand or trump one or more of the preformulated
provisions ("opting out").52 The ability to trump implied terms enables
contracting parties to restructure the implied bargain when necessary to
avoid an ill-fitting formulation.
In principle, therefore, the combination of express supplements and
trumps offers contractors a further opportunity to select between gener-
alized and particularized forms, and so reduce errors caused by both in-
complete and ill-fitting terms. In exercising one or the other option,
however, parties must clearly signal whether they intend merely to en-
rich the state-supplied terms or desire a result other than that normally
inferred from the transactional context. Otherwise, the resulting ambi-
guity could actually increase formulation error, frustrating the very pur-
pose behind introducing express terms.
53
2. Invocations
What mechanisms assist parties who seek to differentiate supple-
mentary terms from trumping expressions? We noted earlier that legal
recognition-the acknowledgement by a court that a mode of agreement
52. See, eg., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1003 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (express
agreement that defendant would pay delay penalty of 200% of total construction costs trumps con-
text evidence that penalty would be limited to 200% of defendant's 25% share of such costs).
53. The interpretive tension between trumping expressions and the implication of context is
further discussed infra in text accompanying notes 134-49.
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has become prevalent-can trigger the metamorphosis of an emerging
formulation into a state-implied norm that parties can countermand only
by a clear disavowal. A similar logic applies to the interpretation of
terms that have a customary meaning whenever used, even if their use is
not so customary as to warrant automatic inclusion as implied terms.
Thus, the legal recognition of certain talismanic words and phrases
greatly facilitates the process of trumping. Definitional recognition does
not change the optional character of these terms. However, it does con-
fer upon them the status of "invocations," 4 terms that, once deliberately
called upon, have a legally circumscribed meaning that will be heavily-
perhaps even irrebuttably-presumed. For instance, the Code recognizes
a series of preformulated expressions that can be invoked by parties in
appropriate circumstances; such expressions as "F.O.B., ''5 5 "F.A.S.," 56
"C.I.F.,"57 and "as is,"'58 carry predefined legal meanings that permit the
parties to escape the contextual interpretation that might otherwise ap-
ply.5 9 A similar interest in permitting escape from particular contexts
motivated "INCOTERMS," the international rules for the interpretation of
trade terms." It also motivated the standard form corporate
54. While the term "invocation" has several common meanings, we use it here in the following
sense: "the act of calling upon or referring to something, as a concept, document, etc., for support
and justification in a particular circumstance." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE 749 (1969).
An early and clear example of such a mechanism was the common law seal. A sealed promise
was enforceable despite evidence of factors such as fraud or duress. See Barbour, The History of
Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 89 (P.
Vinogradoff ed. 1914).
55. See U.C.C. § 2-319(l) & comment 1 (1978).
56. See U.C.C. § 2-319(2) (1978).
57. See U.C.C. § 2-320(1) & comments 1 & 2 (1978).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) & comment 7 (1978). The Code regards "as is," "as they stand"
and "with all faults" as synonymous invocations signalling that the buyer takes the entire risk as to
the quality of the goods.
59. The meanings given to the Code's predefined invocations are subject to contrary agreement
by particular parties. See supra notes 55-58. This raises a troublesome question: can a course of
dealing or performance establish such a contrary agreement, or may the meaning of the invocation
be varied only by a further express understanding? Compare National Heater Co. v. Corrigan Co.
Mechanical Contractors, 482 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1973) (express term "delivered" in purchase order
trumped the usual meaning of "F.O.B. point of shipment" in acknowledgement) with Steuber Co. v.
Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1981) (the normal meaning of CIF, that buyer bears risk of
unloading goods, can be modified by course of performance and oral agreement that seller would
bear unloading risks), and Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1980) (course of performance trumps F.A.S. term in written agreement). We suggest normative
principles of interpretation to resolve this issue infra in Part III.
60. See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE COMM'N, INCOTERMS (1980). Each of the fourteen
INCOTERMS attempts to set forth a number of substantive rules, including, most importantly, the
point at which risk of loss passes from the seller to the buyer. Most of these rules were well-known
and widely used terms of international trade before their formal codification by the International
Chamber of Commerce. See also the more domestic Revised American Foreign Trade Definitions, in
1 A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 151 (1981).
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indenture.61
Invocations, then, can serve as legally unambiguous contractual sig-
nals. Many of the problems we discuss below are fundamentally rooted
in signal misinterpretation and thus suggest that the number and variety
of invocations is somehow inadequate. The inadequacy of the stock of
invocations is vividly demonstrated by the problems that parties encoun-
ter in accurately communicating any revision in the implied, state-sup-
plied terms.
3. The Danger of Attempting Improvements Through Express Terms
From the perspective just outlined, implied and express terms func-
tion, respectively, as a foundation and a set of building blocks for con-
tractual agreements. Ideally, contracting parties can then select the
combinations of implied and express provisions that minimize the aggre-
gate costs of formulation error. The Expanded Choice postulate thus
presents the alluring vision of a legal system that offers an array of widely
useful terms for reducing formulation error and further invites the op-
tional use of atypical terms not on the prearranged menu.
Unfortunately, however, parties must communicate express terms
through the inherently imperfect mediation of words, actions, and other
manifestations that admit of varying interpretations.6" As arbiter of dis-
puted interpretations, the state determines the meaning of whatever sig-
nals the parties exchange. While the state presumably knows what it
means by the formulations it implies into every contract, it does not
know the intended meaning of terms chosen by the parties. Thus, pri-
vately formulated express terms are always subject to an additional di-
mension of interpretation error. This heightened exposure to
61. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.) ("A large degree of uni-
formity in the language of debenture indentures is essential to the effective functioning of the finan-
cial markets: uniformity of the indentures that govern competing debenture issues is what makes it
possible meaningfully to compare one debenture issue with another .. "), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981). See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES (1971).
The federal courts seem generally to recognize that such standard form indenture provisions
are "not the consequence of the relationships of particular borrowers and lenders and do not depend
upon particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983); see also
Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117
(1979).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 118-26. The contingent character of interpretation has
been widely noted in contemporary literary, philosophical and, most recently, legal scholarship. For
a valuable review of the arguments and the literature, see S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
(1980); Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns ofAn Un-
likely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676 (1979); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Legal Thought
(1984) (forthcoming in the California Law Review). Those with a taste for a more in-depth treat-
ment can profit by reading J. CULLER, ON DECONsTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFrER
STRUCTURALISM (1983) and J. DERRIDA, PosrTONS (A. Bass trans. 1981).
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interpretation error may thwart the parties' effort to improve their agree-
ment by employing a combination of nonstandardized supplements and
trumps.
A particularly striking illustration of this additional risk of interpre-
tation error is suggested by the common law maxim of construction ex-
pressio unius exclusio alterius (specific references exclude others similar
in kind). This maxim illustrates the mine field to be traversed in any
attempt to supplement an implied instruction with express terms. A
court may instead construe an express term to exclude or negate other-
wise applicable implied terms. The contractor therefore faces the risk
that an express term designed as a supplement will instead be interpreted
as a trump. Recent disputes over escalation clauses in long-term con-
tracts illustrate this phenomenon. Parties frequently respond to inflation
risks by agreeing to express escalation clauses. Typically, these clauses
describe the costs to be escalated, the indices by which cost changes are
to be measured, and the limits within which fluctuations may occur.
Such clauses generally protect sellers against price increases, but may
cause grave difficulties when unforeseen events expose defects in the esca-
lator provisions. In such cases, courts commonly interpret the contract
narrowly, rejecting the seller's argument that the occurrence of unfore-
seeable circumstances should trigger the usual implied condition excus-
ing performance. In one illustrative case, the court rejected the seller's
claim of excuse, stating:
It is clear that . . . the contract contemplated that foreseeable cost in-
creases would be passed on to the buyer. However, the existence of a
specific provision which put a ceiling on contract price increases resulting
from a rise in [costs] impels the conclusion that the parties intended that
the risk of a substantial and unforeseen rise in [costs] would be borne by
the seller .... 63
The converse error may occur as well-terms intended as trumps
may be interpreted as supplements. Courts typically interpret express
terms by looking to precisely the same commercial and legal context they
use to determine the applicable implied terms. While evidence of con-
tractual context is frequently useful in clarifying meaning, courts may
misuse it in deciding that, no matter what the express terms seem to say,
the apparent meaning is unreasonably peculiar in the circumstances of
the transaction." Giving the contextual patterns interpretive priority
63. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 992
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (emphasis added); see also Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d
721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.) (seller's claim for excuse denied because seller "agreed to the use of the
Industrial Commodities Index"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). But see Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (court equitably adjusted prices following fail-
ure of agreed-upon indexing system).
64. See eg., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980)
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over the express instructions can subvert attempts to redesign ill-fitting
formulations.
If the law too willingly treats the words used to communicate con-
tractual instructions as elastic and highly context-relative, the instru-
ments used to signify trumps become blunt and uncertain. For example,
interpretive rules typically direct courts to construe express and implied
terms "wherever reasonable as consistent with each other."65 The pre-
sumption is limited by its corollary: usages and experience which cannot
reasonably be reconciled with the express terms of a contract should be
held not binding.66 A realistic reading of the case law, however, casts
doubt on the practical dependability of this principle.6' Indeed, there is
almost always some contextual argument upon which seemingly incon-
sistent terms can be rationalized.68 In practice, therefore, the presump-
tion of consistency places a considerable burden on parties who desire to
opt out of the legally implied terms by trumping them with contrary
express provisions. Although parties commonly offer context evidence to
show that a word in a contract has a nonstandard meaning, they may
also offer it to defeat an intended trump. Much of the apparent confu-
sion in the courts about the proper role of context evidence results from
failure to recognize this tension between two goals of the formulation
process: clarification of ambiguous meaning through contextual evidence
and the ability to opt out of implications that the context might other-
wise suggest.
In sum, the additional risk of error inherent in interpreting express
signals challenges the proposition that parties can successfully blend im-
(course of performance and surrounding context suggest that standard meaning of F.A.S. term
might not be applicable); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971)
(course of dealing and usage of trade, if admitted in evidence, demonstrate that express price and
quantity terms in written contract were only "fair estimates"); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North E. Indep.
School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (trade usage admissible to show that
express term "capacities shall not be less than indicated" should be interpreted as permitting "rea-
sonable variations in cooling capacity").
65. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) com-
ment d (1979); Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
161, 188-89 (1965).
66. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) provides that:
[t]he express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as any
course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms shall control
course of performance and course of performance shall control both course of dealing and
usage of trade (Section 1-205).
67. White and Summers assert that usage and dealings "may not only supplement or qualify
express terms, but in appropriate circumstances, may even override express terms." J. WHrrE & IL
SUMMERS, supra note 36, § 3-3, at 98. "[T]he provision that express terms control inconsistent
course of dealing and [usages and performance evidence] really cannot be taken at face value." Id. at
101.
68. For decisions rationalizing text and context under the Code, see cases cited supra in note
64. For a review of courts adhering to the common law view, see cases cited supra in note 124.
1985]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
plied and express terms. The interpreter may err in deciding whether an
individualized express term in apparent conflict with a standard implied
term is an attempt to trump or merely an inartful supplement of a stan-
dard provision. To the extent this makes it significantly more difficult for
parties to neutralize ill-fitting implied terms through recourse to express
trumps, atypical parties lose the practical power to break out of contex-
tual norms. Yet, ironically, a court that mistakenly reads express supple-
ments as sweeping exclusions of implied terms may chill attempts to
articulate incomplete formulations through express provisions. Even if
resource costs are negligible, contractors will be reluctant to draft express
formulations unless such efforts are likely to reduce rather than exacer-
bate error costs. Such assurance can only come through the standardiza-
tion of implied and express terms-a process that both expands and
constrains formulation choices.
D. The Function of Standardization
L The Benefits of Preformulation
Standardized terms-or preformulations-exist both in implied
form and as express invocations. Providing a menu of instructions from
which parties can choose greatly simplifies and reduces the cost of con-
tracting. It is important to realize, however, that the improvement gen-
erated by standardization goes far beyond a mere saving of the additional
resource costs that would be incurred if parties had to articulate com-
pletely the individualized terms for each contract. The typology of for-
mulation error outlined earlier 9 highlights the variety of ways in which
parties can misformulate a contract. Furthermore, the signalling instru-
ments used to reduce such error are themselves imperfect and potentially
defective. Preformulations bring to bear a collective wisdom and experi-
ence that parties are unable to generate individually.
The unique benefits of standardization derive from the process by
which formulations mature and are recognized by the state as having
consistent meaning. A principal effect of this evolutionary process is the
"testing" of combinations of express and implied formulations for dan-
gerous but latent defects. Combinations of formulations are unlikely to
be carefully pretested by individual contractors; testing involves substan-
tial risks, and private developers of successful contractual arrangements
cannot capture much of the benefit that will accrue to subsequent users.
The state's recognition of the evolutionary trial and error process func-
tions as a regulatory scheme designed to promote these "public goods."
Analogously, the Food and Drug Administration tests drugs well beyond
the level of precautions that an individual would adopt for any particular
69. See supra pp. 267-73.
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product, in recognition of the public benefits of guarding against low-
probability but high-impact defects. Contractual instructions may also
contain latent design defects that cannot be avoided simply by encourag-
ing individuals to undertake more careful precautions in the contracting
process. Over time, however, the consequences of standard formulations
are observable in a wide range of transactions, permitting the identifica-
tion and removal of errors of ambiguity, inconsistency, or incomplete-
ness. Thus, mature preformulations become validated by accumulated
experience and are therefore safer than new, innovative formulations.
We can best support this claim by elaborating the several benefits of
preformulation.
a. Labeling
Preformulated terms provide a uniform, and therefore intelligible,
system of communication.7" This "labeling" function is analogous to
governmental provision of regulated standards of weights, measures, and
generic product names, and offers contractors similar communicative ad-
vantages. Labeling serves a number of purposes. A contractor who in-
vests resources to understand fully the effects of a particular
preformulated term can apply his knowledge to understand subsequent
provisions cast in the same form.71 In addition, if all parties who wish to
communicate essentially the same intent embody it in a standard formu-
lation, contractors can more accurately compare the risks of error inher-
ent in different combinations of terms.72
b. Diversification
Preformulation also contributes to the evolutionary enrichment of
the supply of customary forms through the identification, selection and
announcement of specific experiences that can be generalized to particu-
lar classes of transactions. By constantly expanding the stock of
preformulated terms-both express and implied-the state provides pri-
vate parties with more "off-the-rack" choices and thus offers a "better
70. What we call "labeling" is analogous to what Fuller described as the "channeling" func-
tion of legal formality. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1941). See
generally Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1983).
71. "The use of standardized language can result in a better and quicker understanding of
those provisions and a substantial saving of time. . . for. . . all others who must. . . refer to the
indenture. . . ." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982)
(quoting AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 61, at 3), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
72. See, eg., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.) ("[U]niformity of the
indentures that govern competing debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to com-
pare one debenture issue with another. . . without being misled by peculiarities in the underlying
instruments."), cert denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 70, at 1459-
61.
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fit" for those predisposed to purchase a standard cut and size. Diversi-
fied formulations reduce errors that result when parties employ ill-fitting
terms because of a reluctance to craft more carefully tooled provisions on
their own. Thus, by generalizing its implication of terms for particular
parties, the state renders more accessible to individual contractors the
lessons derived from the pooled experiences of others similarly situated.
c. Reliability
A final but critically important benefit of standardized formulations
is the reliability that results from the process of "recognition." A term is
recognized when it is identified through adjudication or statutory inter-
pretation and blessed with an official meaning. Informal or "unofficial"
customary terms may be well-tested and clearly communicative between
parties to the transaction and nonetheless be subject to the prospect of
misinterpretation by the state. This risk jeopardizes efforts to use express
supplements and trumps to reduce aggregate formulation error. Con-
tract interpretation therefore serves to determine and announce relatively
reliable definitions of contractual formulations that are protected by offi-
cial acceptance.
2. The Deterioration of Recognized Preformulations
We have described an evolutionary process in which useful contrac-
tual patterns develop, are tested, and ultimately achieve legal recogni-
tion. The most mature forms are the implied term and the express
invocation. Unfortunately, the life span of these preformulations, espe-
cially the express terms, can be needlessly short.
In addition to ordinary risks of obsolescence, the repetitious use of
express terms generates two special problems, rote use and encrustation.
Each of these is a feature of what is commonly called "boilerplate."
Over time, some formulations get used by rote so consistently that they
lose their meaning.73 Rote usage may develop as a species of contractual
overkill, as in forms that designate already enforceable agreements as
"signed and sealed." Thereafter, the usage is continued because the par-
ties see no reason to eliminate a term they view as costless and thus incur
a risk, however small, of jeopardizing the predefined meaning of their
agreement. Such rote usage imposes a hidden cost on those relatively few
parties who use the preformulation operationally. In the "signed and
sealed" example, their mechanism for requesting enforcement of an
73. Ordinary social relations are similarly replete with phrases that have lost their literal mean-
ing through rote usage. The person who asks "How are you?" usually does not mean to inquire
about your health. Similarly, "Have a nice day," an unusual expression of friendliness a few years
ago, has now lost most of its meaning and has become almost a ritual salutation for personnel in
many retail establishments.
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otherwise unenforceable promise is now corrupted by the fact that the
seal has become meaningless boilerplate.
Formulations are also subject to what we term encrustation, an
overlaying of legal jargon to the point that the intelligibility of the lan-
guage deteriorates significantly. Such boilerplate weakens the communi-
cative properties of preformulations, reducing their reliability as signals
of what the parties really intend.
The tension between particularized and generalized formulations is
thus subject to a further complication: while standardization aids parties
in combining express and implied terms, it also contains self-destructive
characteristics that erode the usefulness of existing preformulations.
This problem, combined with our argument below that standardization
also impedes experimentation with innovative formulations, raises seri-
ous questions concerning the claims of the Expanded Choice postulate.
II
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: REEXAMINING THE
ASSUMPTION OF EXPANDED CHOICE
The discussion in Part I exposes a latent dilemma in the state's role
in contractual formulation. The state's provision of standardized con-
tractual signals reduces many errors that inhere in contractual instruc-
tions. However, these same benefits create a relative disadvantage to
innovative instructions that depart from conventional forms. The abso-
lute benefit of innovation stays the same, while the absolute benefit of
preformulated terms increases. The enhanced status of state-supplied
terms has the perverse effect of reducing contractors' incentives to inno-
vate. Over time, the state-supplied preformulations will themselves fail
to evolve because the flow of innovative formulations, express and im-
plied, will dwindle. The raw material from which preformulations
emerge consists of the expressions and experiences of individual bargain-
ers confronting new and challenging contractual problems. If that trial-
and-error experience is diminished because parties turn to convenient
standardized terms offered by the state, the evolutionary process itself
stagnates.
The Expanded Choice postulate seems to suggest that this relative
disadvantage is the only disincentive to unconventional agreements: the
superiority of preformulated over innovative terms is merely a natural
incident of expanded choice. But focusing exclusively on the natural
benefits of standardized terms ignores two further barriers that hinder
innovation in contractual formulations: the burden of escaping from the
old forms and the difficulty of coordinating a move to new ones.
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A. Institutional Bias Against Unconventional Expression
Judicial contract interpretation is the medium through which the
state integrates privately developed prototypes into the system of publicly
supplied terms. The evolution of these widely useful preformulations is
facilitated by the use of interpretation theories that use context evidence
liberally to supplement both the express terms of an agreement and the
state-supplied legal rules. This objective, however, clashes with the de-
mands of a second interpretive function: facilitating the formulation of
individualized agreements. As noted above, substantial antagonism ex-
ists between these goals, especially in efforts to distinguish between sup-
plementing and trumping options. Contracting parties must be able to
escape the preexisting formulations before they can attempt innovative
agreements. This requires not only that the parties be able expressly to
trump the conventional implied terms, but that the state correctly inter-
pret their efforts. The state's institutional support for implied terms ren-
ders both conditions more problematic.
Increased standardization ideally enables contracting parties to min-
imize aggregate formulation error by more successfully combining ex-
press and implied terms. Nonetheless, a highly developed process for
implying standardized terms to contracts may result in an institutional
bias unless there are parallel enhancements of the express contractual
mechanisms. Any imbalance favoring the relative reliability of implied
provisions increases the burden of opting-out on those who do not wish
the standard terms. Recent cases demonstrate how difficult it is to use
express terms to countermand ill-fitting implied preformulations.74
Overprotection of implied terms threatens the integrity of express
trumping provisions because the interpreter will be reluctant to give ex-
press terms meanings that conflict with the apparent factual and legal
context. One response is for the law to insist-through the rules of inter-
pretation--on certain standards of artful wording. 75 The bias against ex-
press formulations will tend to diminish if key words are given well-
defined meanings.76 This means of protecting the building blocks of ex-
74. See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (merger
clause, excluding evidence of prior dealings, does not bar introduction of usage of trade to alter the
price term in the contract); Legnos v. United States, 535 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1976) (despite
express term "F.O.B. vessel" in contract, international context requires that "the intention of the
contracting nations, rather than definitional niceties, must be given controlling weight").
75. A principal purpose of maxims of construction is to maintain standards of wording that
reduce formulation error. Eg., noscitur a socils (words in a series affected by others in the same
series); ejusdem generis (a general term is limited by a specific term to which it is linked); expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (specific references exclude others similar in kind). See Patterson, The
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. Rnv. 833, 853-54 (1964).
76. Obviously, many of the particularized components of agreements-such as the price and
quantity of goods sold, or the place and terms of delivery-rely upon the "plain meaning" or diction-
ary interpretation of everyday language. In addition, as we discussed above, express terms often rely
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press agreement would require the interpreter to restrict the weight ac-
corded to any extrinsic evidence that vitiates the predefined or "plain"
meaning of certain terms or, in the extreme case of specially-protected
invocations, to ignore context entirely. Unless the supply of standard-
ized express terms is protected and replenished by regular recodification
or judicial recognition, it will become increasingly difficult for parties to
escape customary implied agreements without actually increasing the
risk of formulation error.
Unfortunately, the plain meaning interpretations cannot fully re-
solve the problem of institutional bias. Even a specially defined invoca-
tion is vulnerable to attack as mere rote usage; after sufficient abuse by
rote inclusion, its predefined significance becomes debatable. If success-
fully attacked as mere obsolete "boilerplate," such express terms may
dissolve into the very context they were initially designed to escape. Ju-
dicial interpreters must draw lines that distinguish meaningful expres-
sions from boilerplate. As they do, the reliability of express formulations
as signalling devices diminishes.
In many respects, and perhaps on balance, a more elaborate and
inclusive system of implied preformulation is a positive development, be-
cause it responds to categories of formulation error that are not effi-
ciently addressed by express terms. But attempts to cope simultaneously
with the distinct formulation problems of incompleteness and poor fit
may be frustrated by the inherent antagonism of their respective reme-
dies: the evolution of implied terms and the provision of trumping ex-
pressions to signal unconventional arrangements.77
B. Uncoordinated Behavior: Additional Barriers to Innovation
Even assuming the parties can define contractual language so as to
escape the conventional formulations, the development of innovative for-
mulations will be impeded. A transition to new contractual formulations
frequently must overcome two distinct but interrelated problems. The
first of these is willingness to incur whatever costs are necessary to iden-
tify terms with potential advantages over the status quo. Then, to the
upon "magic words"-legally defined invocations as the building blocks for a custom-tailored con-
tract. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
77. The historical development of contract law supplies an important reason why this tension
between the standardization of express and implied terms has not been fully confronted. Implication
is, at bottom, a willingness of the law to "make a contract" for the parties on the basis of certain
contextual evidence. Initially, the common law was hesitant to accept that task except under a
relatively limited number of general-purpose norms, the "rules" of contract. Through precisely the
sort of evolutionary process alluded to above, however, courts have progressively identified and
carved out special-purpose implied terms for various submarkets and classes of transactions. In
many cases courts have raised informal contractual prototypes to the status of recognized customary
terms. The ultimate development of this trend is the Code's strong preference for inferring custom-
ary norms from context.
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extent that such advantages depend on the standardization benefits dis-
cussed above, groups of contractors must coordinate their joint adoption
of a standard formulation of the terms.
The limits of copyright law create an initial barrier to innovation by
denying contractors substantial property rights in their formulations. 78
An inherent free-rider problem thus retards the production of innovative
formulations for emerging relationships. So long as individual contrac-
tors are incapable of capturing the full benefits of their innovative expres-
sions, new formulations will be underproduced. This produces a lag
between the emergence of new potential relationships and the creation of
improved formulations to exploit the potential. In the interim, con-
tracting parties will continue to use il-fitting terms to ensure reliable re-
sponses to the changed conditions.
The difficulty in coordinating a move to new contractual language
constitutes another barrier to innovation. This problem can best be un-
derstood by way of an analogy-the development of shopping zones. Re-
tail establishments concentrate in particular locations in order to capture
the marketing benefits of concentrated customer access and the comple-
mentarity of certain activities, such as shoe stores and clothing dealers.
The resultant "agglomeration" economies79 benefit all establishments in
the zone. Exogenous shocks-such as migration to the suburbs-fre-
78. The federal copyright statute offers a seemingly broad and expansive protection for all
"original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Nonetheless, the protection of innovative
contractual formulations through copyright raises two separate problems. The first question is
whether a contract form or term is copyrightable at all. In Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the
Supreme Court held that blank forms to be used for recording bookkeeping entries could not be
copyrighted. The court reasoned that granting a copyright monopoly on the written form would
permit the holder to monopolize the idea to which the form is incident. Subsequently, however, the
federal courts have held contractual instruments and other business forms copyrightable whenever
the forms contained terms or explanations inseparable from the underlying plan. See, e.g., Continen-
tal Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). Where,
however, the uncopyrightable idea is so straightforward or so narrow that there are necessarily only
a limited number of ways to express it, any particular form will be uncopyrightable. The rationale
for this limitation is to prevent the idea from being monopolized. See Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
Second, even if copyright protection is available for a particular innovative contractual clause,
the substantive ideas it expresses remain public goods. The federal courts have consistently held that
even though particular wording of a contract has been copyrighted, others are free to embody similar
contractual provisions in their own agreements and may use suitable words to express such provi-
sions. Eg., Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938); cf. American Inst. of
Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (statement in form book that form contracts
should be used as references implied permission to use forms, and precluded infringement action for
use of form printed in the book).
Trade secret rules offer no alternative protection for innovative formulations, since it is the
breach of confidence by unauthorized disclosure, rather than infringement of a property right, which
is the gravamen of trade secret liability. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135
(D.S.C. 1974).
79. See generally W. ISARD, LOCATION AND SPACE-ECONOMY 182-88 (1956); H. NoURSE,
REGIONAL ECONOMICS 85-92 (1968).
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quently make obsolete the locations of existing business districts. Indi-
vidual businesses, however, may be unwilling to invest in discovering a
new, superior location8" and persuading other businesses to move in
numbers large enough to yield adequate agglomeration advantages in the
new location. Development will depend on a private entrepreneur hav-
ing the necessary incentives to purchase a suitable tract of land, organize
the necessary relocation, and capture efficiency gains in the form of its
ownership interest.
Unfortunately, in the case of contractual innovation, the weakness
of property rights impedes any similar solution. Even if private parties
could costlessly discover new, improved terms, they could not readily
coordinate any general move to new forms by other contractors. Certain
private organizations-such as trade organizations and law firms-can
partially overcome the property rights problem that discourages attempts
at contractual innovation. The state's monopoly on the official recogni-
tion of standard meaning will nonetheless impose on any private efforts a
risk of error not borne when using the existing preformulations. The
effect of the state's control over interpretation is the equivalent in the
shopping center example of an entrepreneur being unable to secure in
advance of investment the necessary site plan approval and zoning. In
sum, the contractual equivalent of the obsolete shopping district may not
be abandoned even when the analog of a better location surely exists.
This problem of uncoordinated business behavior is a classic illus-
tration of the optimal solution for one segment of a multidimensional
problem being inconsistent with the optimal solution for the whole.
Standardization, which aims to relieve parties from tasks that generate
formulation errors, indirectly produces a negative effect in a related di-
mension of the formulation process. The fact that preformulation gener-
ates short-term gains at the expense of possible long-term gains does not,
of course, imply that state intervention is on balance undesirable. Evalu-
ating this balance requires an examination of the probable effects of these
barriers to innovative formulations.
C. The Effects of Barriers to Innovative Formulations
Our analysis has shown that barriers to innovative formulations are
an inherent byproduct of state regulation of contract terms. Rather than
merely providing expanded choice, the state's regulation of the formula-
tion process results in a tradeoff between the benefits of reduced error in
80. Although the new location must be superior for all parties who relocate, it need not be
ideal for any particular business. If, for instance, the optimal location for sporting goods stores is
not the best location for clothing stores, the exploitation of agglomeration economies may require a
compromise. Compromise may similarly be prerequisite to the adoption of conventionalized con-
tract terms.
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existing relationships and the costs of failing to exploit fully the potential
gains from new relationships. The previously discussed benefits 'of
preformulated terms must be balanced against these costs. This calculus
requires an assessment of the magnitude of lost opportunities, and of the
ability of market responses to mitigate the loss.
L Lost Opportunities: The Problem of Lags
a. New Formulations for New Relationships
To the extent that there are lags in the evolution of new contractual
standards, parties with emerging needs face a choice. Either they can use
ill-fitting formulations that secure less than maximum trading gains, or
they can incur the costs of crafting new forms of agreement that are bet-
ter adapted to the evolving conditions. To illustrate the empirical rele-
vance of this problem, we briefly discuss two specific examples: the
recent emergence of commerce in low-price, mass-market computer
software; and the intricate, interactive "fast track" method of construc-
tion of large buildings. In addition, we will discuss the more general
historical example of requirements and best-efforts contracts and their
slow acceptance by the legal community. These examples illustrate the
need for innovative formulations when parties enter uncharted legal
landscapes-where mature formulations such as invocations, and even
prevalent trade usages, are lacking.
Technological developments such as the emergence of the
microcomputer sometimes create a new contractual environment. The
recently developed mass market for microcomputer software differs in
important respects from the more mature market in which programs for
large mainframes have been sold.8 Mainframe software transactions
typically involve large sums of money, frequently require negotiation,
and employ a written contract to embody their key terms. They typically
involve relatively sophisticated purchasers. This mainframe market has
evolved a mature legal structure along the lines discussed above: a
menu of contractual preformulations, trade practices and terms, and
party expectations. In the mass market for small computer software, by
contrast, many buyers are extremely ill-informed. There is little negotia-
tion of the vendor's terms, the meaning and enforceability of certain ex-
press terms are uncertain, and there is little common understanding as to
implied terms.
What purposes would express contractual preformulations for mass-
market computer software transactions be designed to serve? Although
81. See generally J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 3.13 (1983); Brooks &
Brewer, Special Problems in the Mass Distribution of Hardware, Software, and Firmware, 1982 U. So.
CAL. COMPUTER INST. § II.
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software for small computers is relatively inexpensive, improper perform-
ance-for instance, by an accounting, inventory control, or other record-
keeping program-may result in heavy losses to users. Software develop-
ers are reluctant to risk indeterminate damage liability and therefore typ-
ically wish to disclaim the customary product warranties and remedies.
Since software is easily duplicated, the vendor may also wish to impose
certain duties on the purchaser. For example, the purchaser may be obli-
gated to use the program exclusively on a particular computer, and to
restrict the accessibility of the product to others who may make illegal
"pirated" copies.
Provisions designed to effect both of these vendor desires are fre-
quently incorporated in a "license agreement" distributed to the con-
sumer. Due to various marketing expedients, especially those related to
high-volume mail-order sales, the buyer may not be presented with the
written contract until product delivery. A widely-used technique, the
"shrink wrap" package, displays the license agreement through a trans-
parent wrapper whose unsealing will, it is stated, be deemed an accept-
ance of the license terms. The enforceability of such an "agreement" is,
of course, open to question and is presently being addressed by legislation
in several states.s2
Beyond the unique mechanics of contract creation, any vendor who
attempts to formulate original protective and restrictive clauses will bear
the risks of formulation error and misinterpretation. A succinct exempli-
fication of this problem appeared recently in a major computer magazine.
A columnist's complaint about the convoluted license agreement and dis-
claimer attached to a software product elicited the following response
from the president of the vendor company:
Soft-Link, as many other software vendors have done, has merely used
wording similar to that used by Digital Research .... Digital Research
has a successful software package, has not been sued out of business, and
has successfully sued against pirates, while other software companies
have difficulty coming up with anything else as simple and as
protective....
Actually, most software houses are willing to be less restrictive in
practice, but with suits being brought for almost any reason, valid and
otherwise, and with such suits being expensive to defend,. . . software
houses will probably continue to use similar wording in warranties and
licenses, if for no other reason than to avoid attorney fees rather than
responsibility.s3
Digital Research, the developer of the standard 8-bit operating system,
82. The computer trade publication Info World describes a recent Louisiana statute and reports
imminent legislative efforts in California, Georgia, and other states. Watt, Louisiana Software Pro-
tection, INFOWORLD, Sept. 3, 1984, at 13.
83. Otten, Warranty Pirates, BYTE, Mar. 1983, at 22 (letter to editors) (emphasis added).
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had developed and implemented its licensing language early in the his-
tory of the microcomputer market. The tested character of the language
apparently outweighed its imperfect fit.
Unusual economic conditions may also create new contractual re-
gimes. Traditionally, construction contract bids were based on complete
designs and specifications. In recent years, however, the combination of
high interest rates and rapid cost inflation has stimulated experiments
with a "fast-track" method of phased construction. Under this method,
many construction tasks are initiated before overall design is complete.
The economic motive for this accelerated procedure is to minimize both
financing costs and inflation of labor and materials costs during the con-
struction period.84 This consolidation of the design and building
processes is often combined with another construction innovation, the
use of a "construction manager" [CM]. The CM combines certain func-
tions traditionally performed separately by the design professional (the
engineer or architect) and the contractor.8 5 On one hand, the CM partic-
ipates in the design process by reviewing proposed designs during devel-
opment and providing recommendations about them. 6 On the other
hand, he serves as a "super general contractor" by coordinating the
prime contractors87 and subcontractors, reviewing change orders, in-
specting the progressing work for deficiencies, preparing and revising
project budgets, and so forth.
Use of the professionally hybrid CM within the fast-track team con-
text raises difficult legal problems." At the least, it departs from the
traditional owner/architect/contractor structure in which the mutual re-
lationships and obligations have been thoroughly worked out and defined
84. The fast track process is a "method of construction by which actual construction is com-
menced prior to the completion of all design, planning, bidding and subcontracting stages in order to
alleviate the effects of inflation." Meathe v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 65 A.D.2d 49, 50, 410
N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
85. On this general topic, see the symposium, Construction Management and Design-Build
Fast/Track Construction, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1983, at 1.
86. AMERICAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CON-
STRUCTIN, Doc. No. B801-1980, at § 1.1.2 (1980) ("Review designs during their development.");
id. at § 1.1.5 ("Coordinate Contract Documents by consulting with. . .Architect regarding Draw-
ings and Specifications as they are being prepared, and recommending alternative solutions whenever
design details affect construction feasibility, cost or schedules."); ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS,
STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, Doc. No.
8d, at § 2.1.4 (1979) ("Review the drawings and specifications as they are prepared, recommending
alternative solutions.").
87. CM's are particularly appropriate for "multiprime" jobs, in which the owner contracts
with a number of primes. See generally Gaede & Bynum, The Multi-Prime Job, in CONSTRUCTION
BRIEFINGS (1979).
88. One writer says the situation makes it "impossible to state a general rule or, in most juris-
dictions, to even predict a result with reasonable certainty." Bynum, Construction Management and
Design-Build/Fast Track Construction from the Perspective of the General Contractor, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs., Winter 1983, at 25, 30.
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by the law over time. Furthermore, the fast-track procedure may be un-
usually contentious, thus placing great practical stress on any theoretical
lacunae in the formulation of the relationships. The very choice of the
procedure implies an unusual concern with speed, symptomized by
poorly defined job specifications and by documents whose formulations
are less refined than has been customary. The procedure is thus inher-
ently susceptible to contractual disputes. For instance, widespread use of
hastily formulated provisional plans tends to bring about disputes over
subsequent change orders and whether they represent true alterations in
the scope of the work or are merely a finalization of the original plans.89
In an extreme case, a contractor may argue that changes constitute such
abandonment of the original contract that quantum meruit is the only
appropriate basis of payment.9" Other difficulties relate less to haste than
to risks of incompleteness error posed by the necessary segmentation of
phased construction, in which responsibilities may fall through the
cracks. As one commentator has noted, "The more the construction
phase of a project is broken into individual packages, the more likelihood
there is that needed construction work or responsibilities will be omitted
in defining the contract packages." 91 Whatever its source, an increased
incidence of revisions heightens the difficulty of coordinating the sched-
ules of subcontractors and therefore exacerbates problems of legal re-
sponsibility for delays and other costs.
In addition, fast-track projects still frequently use standard-form
contract documents whose formulations were evolved in the traditional
fully-designed job environment. This increases some of the inherent
problems of unpredictability. These documents "rarely constitute realis-
tic efforts to deal with the heightened exposure of both general contractor
and subcontractor to the change order, extra work, and scheduling
problems attendant upon a fast track project." 92 The language of partic-
ular fast-track contracts tends to be unique to the project being devel-
oped, and is frequently refined ad hoc as work progresses.93 This
situation is in stark contrast with the thorough testing, in both arbitra-
tion and the courts, of traditional construction contract terms. One rea-
son for the lack of fast-track paradigms may simply be the lag due to free
rider problems and other barriers discussed above. Professor Pratt con-
89. See, eg., City Stores Co. v. Gervais F. Favrot Co., 359 So. 2d 1031 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
90. See Daugherty Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 14 Cal. App. 3d 151, 92 Cal. Rptr. 120
(1971).
91. J. ADRIAN, CM: THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS 219 (1981). A diligent
contractor may find that "extra" work not expressly provided for in the plans must be performed in
order to complete the job. Problems arise over the authorization of such extras.
92. Squires & Murphy, The Impact of Fast Track Construction and Construction Management
on Subcontractors, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1983, at 55, 63.
93. Coulson, Dispute Management Under Modern Construction Systems, LAW & CoNTEmI.
PROBS., Winter 1983, at 127, 132.
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tends, however, that the industry has not wanted to develop new stan-
dard forms for fast-track construction under a construction manager.
Instead, it has deliberately chosen "to keep the concepts loosely defined
to permit a flexible response to the perplexing changes in the economic
climate." 94 This attempt to choose flexibility at the expense of legal defi-
nition, Pratt suggests, risks a bitter result: since modem courts com-
monly intervene to impose standards if the parties provide none, judicial
application of general interpretive norms may result in the fast-track con-
struction industry's being held to rules quite different from those it would
choose for itself.95
Although courts today commonly apply broad standards to give en-
forceable meaning to deliberately indeterminate obligations, their unwill-
ingness to do so for many years created serious contracting problems.
Contractors first employed what we now call "requirements" and "out-
put" contracts in response to uncertain economic conditions in the mid-
nineteenth century. 96 Those admittedly indeterminate agreements were
widely viewed as void for lack of mutuality. 97 But refusal to enforce such
agreements was not universal, 9 and by the beginning of the twentieth
century, courts began to accept the view that it was better to tolerate
"some indefiniteness and uncertainty in contracts [than to tell the par-
ties] that, unless they are able accurately to foretell what nature holds in
store, they cannot safely make contracts which will in some degree be
dependent upon future events." 99 Although this manner of contracting
was ultimately accepted, the prolonged delay in adjustment unquestiona-
bly imposed serious costs, due on one hand to lost opportunities from the
continued use of ill-adapted formulations, and on the other to the inter-
pretation errors1°° caused by the courts' refusal to enforce the parties'
true agreement.
The examples we provide above are admittedly anecdotal. Nonethe-
less, they illustrate important problems which hinder contract formula-
tion in new environments. They demonstrate how the barriers to
innovation can outweigh any opportunity costs, thus producing lag in the
development of new contractual formulations.
94. Pratt, Afterword: Contracts and Uncertainty, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., winter 1983, at
169, 170-71.
95. Id. at 171-72.
96. Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 n. 1 (1932),
reports finding only one American case of this type before the mid-19th century.
97. See, e-g., Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535 (1873). See generally Lavery, The Doctrine of
Bailey v. Austrian, 10 MINN. L. Rv. 584 (1926).
98. For a list of cases finding mutuality in requirement contracts, see id. at 587 n.11.
99. California Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc. v. Wood & Selick, Inc., 2 F.2d 88, 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1924).
100. See also the cases cited supra in note 21.
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b. Plain Language: New Formulations for Existing Relationships
A "plain-language contract" is one that results from converting a
set of complex instructions originally drafted in "legalese" into a more
communicative set of instructions. The legal relationships created by the
new formulation are intended to be precisely the same as those under the
old. Judicial interpretation of plain-language contracts should therefore
be more straightforward than that of contracts expressing genuinely
novel relationships. For several reasons, the experience of the "plain-
language movement" provides insights into the peculiar effects of the
state's role in the production of contractual formulations.101
If the new formulation yields precisely the same set of legal relation-
ships as the old, what benefits are conferred by the translation process?
The answer lies in the distinction between the communication and the
definition functions of contracts. A perfect plain-language translation
has the same legal effect as the original but is better understood by the
parties. The economic benefits of plain-language formulation flow from
several sources. First, it provides assurance to the parties that they un-
derstand one another. A formulation that misleads one or more of the
parties may produce an unintended transaction that results in net harm
rather than mutual benefit. Fear of the unknown consequences of legalis-
tic language may induce some parties not to enter into transactions at all,
although a clear expression of the same relationship would be recognized
as beneficial. Second, if a contract is in fact formed, incomplete under-
standing may obstruct the exploitation of the rights and duties thus cre-
ated. Third, even if perfect understanding is ultimately achieved, excess
understanding costs result in a needless loss.
The problems raised by unclear expressions of the content of a rela-
tionship may be analogized to buying an imported stereo receiver whose
directions are poorly translated-or not translated at all-from the pro-
ducer's foreign language. Although many of the functions of the equip-
ment will be apparent from its general appearance and nature,
advantages and disadvantages both may remain concealed. One cryptic
instruction may warn that the set will melt if plugged into the same cir-
cuit as a steam iron, while another may fail to convey that the red button
on the rear activates a wonderful built-in burglar alarm. If the effect of
such instructions on market acceptance is not entirely clear, consider the
case of similar instructions for the assembly of furniture, or of bicycles,
where the risk is of total loss if the unintelligible instructions are incor-
rectly followed. The lesson applies even more emphatically to transac-
101. See generally E. BISKIND, SIMPLIFY LEGAL WRITING (2d ed. 1975); C. FELSENFELD & A.
SIEGEL, SIMPLIFIED CONSUMER CREDIT FORMS (1978); D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE
LAW (1963); Note, New York's Plain English Law, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451 (1980); Note, A
Model Plain Language Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1981).
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tions--e.g., insurance, credit-where contractual language so much
more fundamentally defines the product itself.
Opponents of change in "legalistic" formulations have contended
that the obscurity of legal language is a necessary side effect of
unambiguousness 0 2 Moreover, resistance to new contractual language
from within the legal profession is "no ordinary conservative fear. Lurk-
ing in the dark background is the always present, rarely voiced lawyer's
fear of what will happen if he is not 'precise'-in the way that the law has
always been 'precise.' "o103 For lawyers, plain and simple language has
long conjured up the specter of negligence liability."° This practical
concern helps to explain why the plain-language movement arouses more
enthusiasm among legal scholars than among practitioners. Scholars ad-
vocate reforms at a conceptual level and have little involvement with
either the mundane drafting difficulties of implementation or the business
risks of testing the new formulation. To the extent that a mature, tradi-
tional formulation deals explicitly with many contingencies, it may in-
deed be more precise, even if less intelligible. Frequently, however, the
precision of legal jargon derives not from its words but from their power
to trigger the implication of established norms, in the form of precedents,
usages, and other dispute-resolution devices. Invocations are classic ex-
amples of this phenomenon. The central challenge for innovators formu-
lating plain-language contracts is to devise ways to call upon the existing
set of norms through substitute language.
Important new plain-language formulations have nonetheless
emerged in the past decade. In 1974, Sentry Insurance Company, a
small Wisconsin auto insurance company, pioneered a "Plain Talk" au-
tomobile insurance policy that has since been filed in forty states and
imitated by other companies.' 0 5 In a similar project that culminated in
1975, Citibank simplified its standard form loan applications and agree-
ments. Coming from the second largest bank in the country, this initia-
tive attracted much attention and had considerable impact in the banking
industry. 06
102. E. GOWERS, THE COMPLETE PLAIN WORDS 91 (1948).
103. D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 101, at 294.
104. Morton, Challenge Made to Beardsley's Plea for Plain and Simple Legal Syntax, 16 CAL.
ST. B.J. 103, 105 (1941).
105. Sentry's revision responded to a nationwide opinion survey which concluded that policy-
holders wanted a contract that they could read and understand. See C. FELSENFELD & A. SIEGEL,
WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 46 (1981). Sentry was apparently willing to accept cer-
tain legal risks in exchange for the presumed marketing advantages. Another plain-language insur-
ance policy was involved in National Merchandise Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), discussed infra in note 108.
106. Why and how Citibank voluntarily subjected itself to the risk that the new forms would not
"hold up in court" merits further attention. Unlike Sentry Insurance, Citibank did not originally
plan to exploit the potential market benefits of plain language. According to Carl Felsenfeld and
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Companies that adopt and continue to use new formulations evince
their perception that the marketing advantages outweigh the legal risks.
It is not clear, however, to what extent these risks have yet material-
ized.1 1 7 Evidence is sparse as to the impact of plain-language insurance
and banking forms on interpretational disputes. Few litigated cases con-
strue the new plain-language clauses, although out-of-court settlements
and the perceived positions of parties may have been materially affected.
The financial feasibility of plain-language reformulation will become
clearer as additional experience accumulates.
2. The Limits on Market Responses to Lags
a. The Recognition Problem
The plain-language experience also illustrates the dangers of even
the most straightforward attempts by private parties to employ uncon-
ventional or unrecognized contractual forms. An important goal of the
drafter of any contractual formulation is to create a contract that a court
will interpret in a predictable way. Presumably one can always translate
legal jargon into language that is more easily understandable than the
original. However, there is no practical assurance that a court will treat
the new formulation as equivalent to the old. Contractual language is
subject to ambiguity error to the extent that it lacks pre-established con-
ventions for its interpretation. This is so whenever new terms are
adopted. The problem is not the intelligibility of the new terms; rather,
the change itself weakens the relevance of the existing stock of dispute-
resolving conventions that the traditional language invoked. Thus, in-
Alan Siegel, two lawyers who worked on redesign of the personal note, the simplification project
"began as an exercise in design, as Citibank. . . sought to make its forms better looking and easier
for customers to deal with. There was, at the outset, no particular interest in changing the docu-
ment's language to make it more readable." C. FELSENFELD & A. SIEGEL, supra note 105, at 27. It
became apparent, however, that a successful redesign would have to be accompanied by improve-
ments in the text. The bank's legal staff attempted to identify provisions that had actually been
litigated, and retained them. At the same time, they omitted rarely used sections, substituting a brief
paragraph for a detailed list of circumstances when the consumer would be considered to be in
default. "Perhaps the hardest part of this task was not writing in plain English, but identifying
provisions taken from traditional contracts. . . that could be eliminated without injuring the legal
enforceability of the document." Ia at 28.
The new forms did become a selling point for the bank. A study conducted by the Research
Department of Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn showed that customers so much preferred the
new personal loan note that they expressed interest in using other services of any bank that used this
loan agreement. Id. at 29-30. From a business point of view, therefore, an innovative plain-language
contractual formulation may have marketing benefits worth more than the risk of increased legal
exposure. To compare the old personal loan note with the simplified version, see id. at 3 (old note),
241 (revised note). For examples of plain language forms, see P. TILL & A. GARGIULO, CON-
TRACTS: THE MOVE TO PLAIN LANGUAGE 46-49 (1979).
107. "Like soldiers who have been 'in the army' but not 'in combat,' most of the words in the
cases have been 'in litigation' but not 'litigated.'" D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 101, at 375.
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creased communicational clarity may, ironically, decrease definitional
certainty.
The private developer of plain-language reformulations thus bears a
legal risk which diminishes the market incentive for such communicative
improvements. When the new formulation is an attempt to translate a
preexisting formulation, the parties must depend on the courts' making
the connection between the new formulation and the old content, with its
penumbra of judicial construction and usages. We call this phenomenon
"linkage." If courts adopt a linkage principle, the preexisting jargon will
become a useful device for interpreting the reformulated clauses. 108 Ab-
sent a linkage principle, however, commercial drafters are vulnerable to
the common law contra proferentem maxim of construction against the
drafter, particularly in the consumer contract setting. 109
Suppose, for instance, that one clause in a company's plain-language
contract was ambiguous and that consulting the prior standardized ver-
sion of the corresponding language would resolve the meaning in favor of
the drafter company rather than the consumer. Which interpretation
would a court likely support? The risk that a court will apply contra
proferentem arguably chills the development of innovative contractual
108. This approach appears in National Merchandise Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So.
2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), which involved a dispute over interpretation of an innovative
"Easy Reading Auto Policy." The policy stated that the insurer "will pay damages for bodily injury
or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto
accident," but nowhere specifically defined the term "auto accident." Id. at 529 (emphasis added by
the court). A child died of drugs ingested in a parked car, and the trial court denied relief, reasoning
that the auto was merely the situs and not causally related to the injury. Reversing, the appellate
court looked to previous language and usage:
There is a virtual parade of Florida auto insurance cases dealing with clauses insuring
against injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of an automobile. It is
apparent to us that the words "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of an
automobile do not appear in insurance policies by mere happenstance. This is common
and customary boiler plate language used in auto insurance contracts to define the scope
and extent of coverage provided ...
Thus, confronted with a term that is standardized in the industry, we must recognize
the principle that . . . [c]ommercial transactions and contracts should be interpreted in
light of custom or trade usage.
Id, at 530-31 (citations omitted). Hence, the court not only referred to the old contractual language
to define "auto accident" as any accident "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use," but it
also invoked the associated stock of precedents and usages.
Although this approach is commendable, it does not appear to be widely accepted. Indeed, the
significance of National Merchandise is limited; the same result would likely have been reached on
other grounds.
109. For example,
When the terms used are ambiguous, we are required to construe the policy against
U.S.A.A., because it drafted the policy. Insurance policies are contracts, and it is well-
established that contracts are construed against the drafter in the face of any ambiguities,
"This rule is especially true when the drafter stands in a position of trust, or greater profes-
sional or business knowledge."
Id. at 530 (citations omitted) (quoting Planck v. Traders Diversified, Inc., 387 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition dismissed, 394 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1981)).
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language, even language that attempts merely to express an unchanging
set of relationships, as with a plain-language contract. 110
Although market forces apparently suffice to motivate some plain-
language reformulations, the barriers even to this relatively simple form
of innovation have been surprisingly strong. Even when the formulation
barriers can successfully be surmounted, subsequent free-riding on the
new formulations may detract significantly from the market advantages
that could otherwise be captured by the innovator. Furthermore, coordi-
nating a change in contractual forms requires the cooperation of the state
in recognizing the new conventions. Absent compensating benefits, then,
the risks inherent in nonrecognized formulations will deter socially bene-
ficial improvements in intelligibility. The plain-language experience sup-
ports the hypothesis that the progress of private contractual innovation
will be slower and quantitatively weaker than its social benefits might
justify.
b. Private Alternatives to Official Recognition
Thus far we have discussed only the official recognition accorded by
the state. However, private institutions can develop a form of unofficial
recognition by formulating contractual conventions that become widely
accepted as clear signals. Such unofficial recognition is less valuable than
official recognition precisely because the state's ultimate interpretation
may differ from the unofficial understanding. Nevertheless, as we shall
show, unofficial forms provide a partial substitute for official ones, and
may pave the way for official recognition or codification.
Trade organizations provide a mechanism to internalize at least
some of the gains from contractual innovation. If an organization repre-
senting a significant subset of the formulation's potential users develops a
term, it can supply the coordination necessary to overcome the free-rider
problems discussed earlier."' Industry codes can therefore play a signifi-
cant role in developing new formulations to respond to changing condi-
tions within certain markets. Often, though, the content of private codes
is not intended to be innovative. The International Chamber of Com-
merce's INCOTERMS, for example, codifies rules that were already
widely used. 2 Even a mere codification increases access to tested for-
110. A persuasive case can be made against applying the traditional contra proferentem rule in
these circumstances. The presumption against the drafter is designed to discourage the use of terms
that, because poorly defined and thus ambiguous, may be misleading. A plain language revision also
seeks to improve language that may be misleading, but does so by attempting to increase the commu-
nicative value of the terms, even though the original wording may be sharply defined in a legal sense
and therefore not ambiguous. As we have noted, an improvement in intelligibility might be socially
desirable even if the cost is some increase in ambiguity.
I 11. See supra Part II, Section B.
112. See Portney, Letter Rulings: An Endangered Species?, 36 TAx LAW. 751 (1983).
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mulations, enhances the communicative aspects of contracts, and ad-
dresses the problem of construing amorphous unofficial rules. Passive
codifications do not, however, address the problem of lag.
The presence of trade organizations willing to take an active role in
shaping new formulations does not always eliminate the lag between the
development of new business conditions and the availability of the appro-
priate contractual formulations. The response to the fast-track construc-
tion manager development is instructive. Two rival professional
organizations produced model contractual forms defining the role of the
CM. The documents produced by the American Institute of Architects
[AA] 113 differed in significant ways from those of the prime contrac-
tors' trade group, the Associated General Contractors [AGC].114 The
difference diminished any reliability benefits such documents might nor-
mally generate and may also have caused further lag in the development
of industry-wide prototypes, thereby creating an independent potential
for confusion. Furthermore, although the CM phenomenon was impor-
tant enough in the early 1970s to stimulate articles in the professional
journals,1 5 the trade formulations did not appear until nearly ten years
later." 6 Finally, both sets of formulations have yet to be thoroughly con-
strued; the state's response as the ultimate definitional interpreter is still
pending. Thus, even when private codifications do respond directly to
the lag problem, they are likely to operate with delay, possibly at cross-
purposes, and always at the mercy of the official interpretation process.
Law firms are examples of another institution that produces innova-
tive formulations, although their incentives differ from those of trade or-
ganizations. A large law firm with an extensive practice in a particular
subject area has the experience necessary to the testing function. More-
over, it may be able to confine the benefits to its own set of clients, reduc-
ing free-rider effects. The feasibility of law firm innovation is illustrated
by the widely held belief that bond covenants, indentures, and many
other standard features of corporate financial agreements originated in a
small group of New York law firms that had a dominant market position
113. AMERICAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS, supra note 86, Doc. Nos. AlO/CM, A201/CM, B141/
CM, B801. See generally J. Sweet, Lawmaking by Standard Forms: A Study of A.I.A. Contract
Documents (1978) (unpublished manuscript).
114. ASSOCIATED GEN. CoNTRACTORs, supra note 86, Doc. Nos. 8a (1977), 8d (1979), 8
(1980), and 520 (1980). For a discussion of the differences between the two sets of documents, see
Sweet, The Architectural Profession Responds to Construction Management and Design-Build: The
Spotlight on AIA Documents, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1983, at 69, 78-81.
115. See, eg., Lammers, Construction Manager: More Than A Hard-Hat Job, AIA J., May
1971, at 31; Wagner, Where, Oh Where, Are the Management Skills?, ARCHITECTURAL REC., Dec.
1971, at 9.
116. The AIA's set of CM documents did not appear until 1980. See AMERICAN INST. OF
ARCHITECTS, supra note 86.
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in these transactions. 117 As our examples suggest, however, the success
of such private efforts often depends on fortuitous special circumstances.
3. Summary
The existing stock of "established" terms-comprised of implied
and express preformulations and other mature contractual prototypes-
has a dual effect. On the one hand, the availability of well validated and
officially recognized forms of agreement is necessary to enable parties to
fashion an optimal combination of express and implied terms. On the
other hand, the maintenance of an established stock poses certain
problems. The status of time-tested formulations is, of course, partially
justified by the genuine safety and reliability which they provide. But
state support for the entrenched forms produces an inherent, but unwar-
ranted, institutional bias against unconventional expression. The favored
institutional status of old forms makes it less attractive to invest in the
development of new formulations to respond to emerging business needs.
A classic free-rider problem further weakens the vigor of the evolution-
ary process, as do the vexing logistics of coordinating a conversion to the
new terms. Joint private efforts to generate innovative formulations may
occasionally mitigate some of these problems, and market forces suffice
to promote some development of new contractual forms. Nevertheless,
the state's control of the recognition mechanism serves, on balance, to
retard the evolution process.
III
PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS: RETHINKING CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION
We have analyzed the role of formulations as instruments which re-
duce certain types of errors in the articulation of contractual agreements.
To be sure, private parties and institutions have natural incentives to re-
duce formulation error, including the opportunity cost of reliance on ill-
fitting terms. Because the state retains ultimate control over the defini-
tion to be attached to any formulation, full realization of this goal de-
pends inevitably upon the character of state involvement in the
formulation process. Only the state has the power to minimize certain
legal risks that otherwise deter private innovation.
Should the state choose to enhance the reliability of contractual
forms, two distinct types of legal rules would be required. First, the state
must motivate contracting parties to take sufficient precautions against
the risk of their own formulation errors. Second, the state must choose
117. While this plausible hypothesis has been cited to us by a number of practicing lawyers and
legal scholars, we have been unable to confirm it by other than anecdotal evidence.
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principles of interpretation that preserve the utility of the core signalling
devices of contractual formulation. In order to accomplish either of
these goals, the legal interpreter must be sensitive to the distinctive ways
in which contractual instructions can be defective. Such a sensitivity,
however, requires a reassessment of traditional notions about the pur-
poses of contractual interpretation.
A. The Purposes of Contractual Interpretation
Conflict between the subjective and objective theories of contract
has been a dominant theme in contract jurisprudence for the past two
hundred years."' The contemporary manifestation of this dichotomy
centers on the debate over principles of interpretation and meaning. At
first glance, the debate appears to be an illustration of the pendulum
swinging between objective and subjective poles. At the one pole are the
"textualist" arguments of the legal formalists who urge strict adherence
to the parol evidence and plain-meaning rules in order to preserve the
"objective" meaning of written agreements.1 19 The opposite, subjective
pole of the interpretation continuum takes as its starting point the as-
sumption that "the purpose of the court in all cases is the ascertainment
of the intention of the parties if they had one in common."12 Following
Corbin's lead, the seekers of the "true" meaning of agreements regard
textual formalism as an anachronistic impediment to the consideration of
118. The "intuitionist" theory of the inherent moral force of promises formed the basis of objec-
tive obligation for the social contract theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries. The 19th-century
response to the objective morality of contract was the "will" theory in which contract was conceived
as merely executing and protecting the will of the parties. The 19th-century formalists, typified by
Langdell and Pollack, used the notion that the essence of contract is the subjective agreement of
wills-or the "meeting of minds"-to craft the classical bargain theory of consideration. Inevitably,
the obvious difficulties in identifying subjective intention led to the evolution of an objective theory
of agreement that focused on the "manifestation" of intent rather than its subjective reality. See
Goetz & Scott, supra note 8, at 1263 & n.15.
119. The textualist argument is vividly captured in Judge Learned Hand's famous dictum:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of
the parties. . . .If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held ....
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affid, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912),
affid, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); see also Cernohorsky v. Northern Liquid Gas Co., 268 Wis. 586, 68
N.W.2d 429 (1955):
The language of a contract must be understood to mean what it clearly expresses. A
court may not depart from the plain meaning of a contract where it is free from ambiguity.
In construing the terms of a contract, where the terms are plain and unambiguous, it is the
duty of the court to construe it as it stands, even though the parties may have placed a
different construction on it.
Id. at 592-93, 68 N.W.2d at 433 (citation omitted); RESrATEMENr OF CONTRACTS § 230 comment
b (1932); 4 S. WILLISTON supra note 36, § 609, at 403-04 n.2 (citing supporting cases).
120. Corbin, supra note 65, at 162; see also Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76
YALE L.J. 939, 951-52 (1967).
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relevant contextual evidence.121 Through the revised rules of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Second Restatement,12 2 the "contextual-
ists" have succeeded in reducing greatly the exclusionary potential of the
interpretive process.
Conventional wisdom holds that the battle is over and the contextu-
alists have swept the field. The Code and the Second Restatement have
abandoned the plain-meaning rule and eviscerated the parol evidence
rule.123 However, a close examination of the case law reveals a surpris-
ingly different picture. In numerous cases, courts are unwilling to accept
the full implications of contextualization; in one guise or another, they
still invoke the primacy of express, written texts to exclude extrinsic
evidence. 124
121. Corbin, supra note 65, at 164-70; Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 959-65. Without context,
the argument goes, the search for meaning must necessarily fail, since a text has no objective or
unitary meaning apart from the peculiar referents
122. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS §§ 212-214 (1979).
Under the revised parol evidence rule of the Code and Second Restatement, certain extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible even if the express terms of the contract are clear and apparently integrated.
Indeed, extrinsic evidence of prior negotiation and dealing is always admissible to explain the mean-
ing of a written instrument. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACMS, § 213 comment b
(1979).
123. Sunbury Textile Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1978) (notwithstand-
ing written merger clause, extrinsic evidence of intention is admissible); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1982) (extrinsic evidence may be turned to initially in construing a
contract); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d
641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968) (meaning of writing can only be found by interpretation in light of all
circumstances); Michigan Bean Co. v. Senn, 93 Mich. App. 440, 287 N.W.2d 257 (1979) (parol
evidence admissible to supplement and explain written agreement); United States Nat'l Bank v.
Cadwell, 60 Or. App. 639, 655 P.2d 180 (1982) (intent of parties found in language and surrounding
circumstances), petition denied, 294 Or. 536, 660 P.2d 682 (1983).
124. Indeed, the continuing vitality of the traditional parol evidence and plain-meaning rules
cannot be underestimated. A quick search reveals the numerous recent decisions that have reaf-
firmed a textualist approach to interpretation. L.S.S. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 695 F.2d 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (parties bound by objective import of words, citing Hotchkiss); Watkins v. Petro-
Search, Inc. 689 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1982) (unambiguous writing will be accorded the meaning appar-
ent on its face; objective and not subjective intent controls); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981) (parol evidence not admissible to explain
unambiguous exculpatory clause; Washington law); Mellon Bank v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619
F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980) (parties bound by unambiguous written expression of intent); Lee v.
Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (plain-meaning rule bars evidence of meanings of
unequivocal contract terms, parol evidence rule distinguished); Reed, Wible & Brown, Inc. v. Ma-
hogany Run Dev. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 1095 (D.V.I. 1982) (parties bound by objective manifestations,
citing Hotchkiss); Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 548 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. La. 1982) (intention determined
according to plain, ordinary, and popular sense of language used), aff'd, 721 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.
1983); William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Tomah Broadcasting Co., 543 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Wis.
1982) (unambiguous contract language should be given its plain meaning, with no need to consider
extrinsic evidence or rules of construction), rev'd on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1983);
Goldberg v. Lowe, 509 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Miss. 1981) (parties bound by objective manifestation);
King v. Gilbert, 445 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (plain meaning must be followed even if result is
completely unintended by parties); Kreis v. Venture Out in America, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 482 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973) (unambiguous language may not be altered by parol evidence); Eskimo Pie Corp. v.
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The apparent disarray that afflicts judicial efforts to interpret con-
tractual agreements results from a fundamental misconception of the
purposes of contract interpretation.125 The textualists have implicitly as-
sumed that the purpose of interpretation is to maintain the reasonable
expectations of contracting parties as a class by upholding the objective
integrity of express contractual language. By contrast, the contextualists
have assumed that the purpose of interpretation is to uphold the expecta-
tions of the particular parties to the agreement by determining from an
analysis of all relevant evidence what they "really meant." Neither as-
sumption accords fully with the underlying objectives of contract formu-
lation, and it is this distortion that accounts for the apparent conflict over
proper modes of interpretation.
What appear at first to be irreconcilable differences in judicial appli-
cations of the parol evidence and plain-meaning rules can be rationalized
if the assumed goals of contractual interpretation are recharacterized.
The purposes of contract interpretation, properly conceived, are neither
to determine a fixed, objective meaning of a written agreement nor to
ascertain the true or subjective understanding of individual contracting
parties. Our thesis is that interpretation should126 embrace the institu-
Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (U.C.C. parol evidence rule admits
evidence of course of dealing, but is limited to objective facts as distinguished from oral statements of
agreement, and does not encompass proof as to subjective intent); First Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States
Eng'g & Sales, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 572, 431 N.E.2d 1052 (1981) (plain meaning unless it clearly
appears unusual meaning intended); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 141
N.E.2d 590, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957) (same); Lineberry v. Lineberry, 59 N.C. App. 204, 296 S.E.2d
332 (1982) (express contractual provisions unambiguous, parol evidence improperly admitted);
HBOP, Ltd. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 645 P.2d 1042 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (parol evidence
inadmissible); Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45, 444 A.2d 659 (1982) (same); Murphy v. Hagan,
275 S.C. 334, 271 S.E.2d 311 (1980) (meaning of unequivocal document determined facially); Berry
v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 300 S.E.2d 792 (1983) (plain-meaning rule controls interpretation of"unam-
biguous" written contract).
125. This misconception stems, in turn, from the twin fallacies of objective and subjective mean-
ing. The textualist assertion that words have plain or inherent meaning fails to recognize that a
characterization of one meaning as "objective" is itself a conclusion dependent upon the values and
assumptions of the interpreter. Thus, as Corbin suggested, "when a judge refuses to consider rele-
vant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of written words is to him plain and clear,
his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his own per-
sonal education and experience." Corbin, supra note 65, at 164. "In this process of interpretation,
no relevant credible evidence is inadmissible merely because it is extrinsic; all such evidence is neces-
sarily extrinsic." Id. at 189.
The myth of objectivity, however, is mirrored by the myth of subjective truth. In fact, context
is infinitely elastic. In selecting certain bits of context and not others, the interpreter necessarily
imposes his own set of assumptions and beliefs on the contract. See, eg., Peller, supra note 62; see
also S. FISH, supra note 62; Abraham, supra note 62, at 683-88. The realization that interpretation is
contingent on the underlying assumptions of the interpreter helps focus attention where it belongs:
on the underlying assumptions themselves.
126. We do not use the term "should" in its ordinary normative sense. Rather, our proposal is a
plea for internal consistency, for coherence in basic assumptions within the "community of interpre-
tation" that shares those assumptions. See Fish, Interpreting the Variorum, CRITICAL INQUIRY,
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tional goal of motivating improvements in both the express and implied
preformulations that constitute the defining instruments of contract.
This explains much of the apparent incoherence of the case law. Most
modem courts, both under the Code and the common law, appear will-
ing to admit parol evidence in order to identify any commercial practices
that shape the agreement between the parties. But these same courts are
often unwilling to permit extrinsic evidence to be used to challenge the
plain meaning of clear and unambiguous express terms.12 7 While the ju-
dicial practice seems superficially incoherent, further reflection reveals it
as a valid approach to preserving the role of both implied and express
forms.
Under this perspective, the opposing poles of the interpretive contin-
uum are actually converse to their traditional representations. The con-
textual search of extrinsic evidence for subjective meaning is actually a
key element of the process by which evolving customary norms of gen-
eral application are recognized and officially adopted. On the other
hand, the textualist effort to exalt objective meaning over individual in-
tent is better understood as protective of the ability to assert particular-
ized understandings in the face of contrary inferences from context. The
dichotomy between objective and subjective meaning emerges as an in-
herent interpretive tension generated by efforts to accommodate both
generalization and particularization, the core processes of contractual
formulation. Failure to understand and confront the competing nature
of these goals inevitably results in confusions about the appropriate poli-
cies to apply in contractual interpretation.
B. Principles of Interpretation
1. The Communication Function: Motivating Optimal Precautions
There are inherent limitations in the symbols we use to communi-
cate that make disputes about meaning an unavoidable risk of any system
Spring 1976, at 465, 483-84 (discussing notions of "interpretive communities"). If the goals of con-
tract formulation require the preservation of instruments of generalization and particularization,
then harmony within the "community" requires principles of interpretation grounded on the same
assumptions. Whether these normative objectives are themselves preferable to possible alternatives
raises a separate question beyond the scope of this inquiry.
127. A number of courts have balanced a liberal interpretation of the parol evidence rule with a
strict adherence to the plain-meaning rule. See, eg., Mellon Bank v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,
619 F.2d 1001, 1010 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980) ("This issue of ambiguity [of meaning] must be carefully
distinguished from the issue of'integration.' "); Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1281 (D.C. Cir.
1979) ("Strictly speaking, the parol evidence rule does not bar extra-contractual evidence of mean-
ings. . . that is the function of the plain meaning rule."); Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661-
62 (1982) ("While adhering to the plain meaning rule of construction, this Court, too, has cautioned:
We are not unmindful of the dangers of focusing only upon the words of the writing in interpreting
an agreement."); see also Watkins v. Petro-Search, Inc., 689 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); First
Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Eng'g & Sales, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 572, 431 N.E.2d 1052 (1981) (same).
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of information. In the particular case of contractual formulation, the
presence and interaction of a number of other variables exacerbate the
problem. The incidence of many types of formulation error depends di-
rectly on the level of precaution taken during the contracting process.
Most administrative errors, for example, result from accidental misstate-
ments or omissions. Similarly, incompleteness errors occur when parties
fail to allocate the risks of various contingencies-usually those having a
low probability-leaving terms unspecified. Finally, inconsistency errors
result when parties fail to coordinate properly their express and implied
instructions.
To the extent that litigation costs are subsidized by the state, con-
tracting parties have inadequate incentives to reduce their own commu-
nication errors. 128 A number of legal rules, however, sanction parties
who take insufficient precautions against the risk of errors in communi-
cation. Thus, for example, while administrative errors can generally be
remedied by either party seeking reformation of the agreement, equity
may bar relief to a party guilty of "inexcusable neglect."12 9 Similarly, the
law of mistake generally assigns the risk of reasonably foreseeable ambi-
guity or incompleteness errors to the party in the better position to avoid
them, unless the other party had "reason to know" of the mistake. 130
Much like the rules of negligence and contributory negligence, these
compound liability rules encourage both parties to take precautions to
minimize such errors.131 The common law maxim of contra proferentem
is a further influence on the drafting efforts of contracting parties. Its
hostile presumption provides an incentive to avoid drafting poorly com-
municative contractual terms. 132
128. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 63-65. Negotiation and drafting costs are
in a sense precautionary, in that they help reduce the likelihood, and perhaps the scope, of litigation,
and thus its total cost. Litigation costs are not fully "internalized," however, unless they are borne
by the parties themselves. Thus, state-subsidized litigation diminishes the relative incentive to nego-
tiate and draft error-free formulations.
129. See, ag., Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760 (1941) (reforma-
tion denied parties who deeded property knowing of recorded lease but ignoring its contents). In the
case of mistake, reformation will be granted despite the negligence of the party claiming relief. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 comment a (1979). This statement is overbroad,
however, because it assumes that the party seeking relief has proven the error by clear and convinc-
ing evidence and that the other party has not changed position in reliance on the written instrument.
See, ag., Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 38 S.E.2d 534 (1946).
130. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-154 (1979); R. Scott, Contract
Law and Theory 210-12 (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
131. See generally Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
132. See, ag., William B. Tanner Co. v. Waseca-Owatonna Broadcasting, 549 F. Supp. 411 (D.
Minn. 1982) ("valid until used" is an ambiguous term and will be construed against the drafter);
National Merchandise Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
("auto accident" is ambiguous term construed against drafter); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105
(Utah 1982) (dispute involving seller's obligation to improve real property resolved against buyer
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In addition to the substantive common law rules, procedural or evi-
dentiary rules can also operate to create incentives for the reduction of
formulation error. This is harder to see. Substantive rules are readily
recognized as shaping the behavior of future contracting parties. By con-
trast, the plain-meaning and parol evidence rules are conventionally seen
as merely helping to determine what the parties to the present dispute
intended. This focus on particularized intent obscures the fact that rules
of interpretation have a profound prospective effect. Moreover, while
they are traditionally regarded as operating in tandem, the parol evidence
and plain-meaning rules influence formulation behavior in distinct and
different ways. 3' The following discussion indicates how skillful use of
these tools can reduce the tension between conflicting methods of error-
reduction.
2. The Definition Function: Reducing Interpretation Error
Interpretation errors result in part from the failure of courts to dis-
tinguish correctly among the different signals used by contracting parties.
Even if an agreement were perfectly communicative between the parties
initially, one of the parties may dispute its meaning as a strategic re-
sponse to a now disfavored arrangement. Frequently, such disputes
center on alleged inconsistencies between express and implied terms. Be-
cause of the inherently uncertain mediation of words, errors are inevita-
ble in the process of defining the meaning of different combinations of
terms. The risk of this source of interpretation error depends directly on
two variables: (1) the extent to which the agreement employs both ex-
press and implied terms; and (2) the ambiguity of the express signals
chosen by the parties. Different rules of interpretation regulate the oper-
ation of each of these variables. The parol evidence rule determines
which implied and express terms are legally relevant. For instance, a
narrow, common law version of the rule reduces the interaction between
express and implied terms and thus reduces the risk of inconsistency dis-
putes. The plain-meaning rule, on the other hand, regulates the evidence
used to interpret express instructions and determine whether the parties
have chosen trumping or supplementary signals. Rigorous application of
the plain-meaning rule reduces interpretation error by encouraging more
who drafted contract for sale); see also M.W. Zack Metal Co. v. International Navigation Corp. of
America, 675 F.2d 525 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982); United States v. N.A. Deger-
strom, Inc., 408 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1969); Wofac Corp. v. Hanson, 131 Ga. App. 725, 206
S.E.2d 614 (1974); Jacoby v. Grays Harbor Chair & Mfg. Co., 77 Wash. 2d 911, 918, 468 P.2d 666,
671 (1970); Patterson, supra note 75, at 854.
133. The plain-meaning rule encourages parties to select clear signals that enable the interpreter
to differentiate between supplementary and trumping expressions. The parol evidence rule, on the
other hand, motivates parties to select express rather than implied formulations. See A. SCHWARTZ
& R. ScoTT, supra note 4, at 46-47.
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careful choices of clear, predefined signals. Nevertheless, if the norma-
tive goal is to minimize aggregate error, insensitive application of either
the plain-meaning or parol evidence rule is counterproductive. The task
is to reduce interpretation error without incurring greater costs in an-
other dimension of the formulation process.
a. The Problem of Distinguishing Between Supplements and Trumps
When a dispute arises over an apparent inconsistency between ex-
press and implied terms, courts are required to distinguish between sup-
plementary expressions and trumps. At least for "contingent"
contracts, 134 optimal rules of interpretation can reduce the resulting risk
of interpretation error. The capacity of contingent contractors to partic-
ularize details of the contract in express terms suggests a hierarchy of
presumptions to resolve disputes over arguably inconsistent terms.
Consider hypothetical negotiations between Development Corpora-
tion and Marketing Corporation. Assume that Development grants
Marketing the exclusive rights to distribute "Readi-Calc," its revolution-
ary computer program with advanced spreadsheet capabilities. Assume
further that applicable law will incorporate into their written agreement
a variety of implied terms, including a duty that Marketing use its best
efforts in promoting the sale of the Readi-Calc program and a correlative
duty that Development cooperate fully in efforts to achieve the contrac-
tual objectives.1 35  The implied duty of cooperation would ordinarily
oblige Development to keep Marketing informed of anticipated techno-
logical developments that would affect distribution of the product. In the
present situation, however, the risk to Development if certain proprietary
secrets escape is sufficiently acute that the parties agree to an express
instruction that "any disclosures of technological research are to be at
the sole discretion of Development." Nevertheless, because such disclo-
sures are generally in the mutual interests of the parties, analysis of con-
text and usages will show a significant exchange of information between
the parties.
Subsequently, a new integrated software package is introduced by a
competitor and captures the dominant position in the software market.
134. Contingent contracts are defined by the presumption that the parties are capable of foresee-
ing all possible contingencies and have explicitly provided for the allocation of associated risks.
They stand in contrast to "relational" contracts, for which the presumption is untrue, and in which
the parties must thus be presumed to contemplate a continuing relationship for resolving the alloca-
tions of risks as they become foreseeable. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 4, at
1089-90.
135. Unless otherwise specified, the obligation to use best efforts is an implied duty of the dis-
tributor in all exclusive dealings arrangements. See U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (1978). The duty of coopera-
tion is implied in all contracts that leave particulars of performance to be specified by one party, or
where one party's cooperation is necessary to, or materially affects, the performance of the other. Id.
§ 2-311(1), (3).
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Development argues that Marketing has not marketed its program effec-
tively and is thus in violation of its best-efforts obligation.136 Marketing
asserts that Development's failure to inform it of the competitor's forth-
coming technological advance was a breach of the duty of cooperation
which contributed to the loss. 137 Development counters that the agree-
ment expressly authorized withholding such market-research data, and
that the express provision trumps the contrary implications drawn from
practices between the parties or in the trade. How should a legal deci-
sionmaker apply rules of interpretation to resolve whether the express
term was intended as a supplement or as a trump?
b. Parol Evidence: The Presumption that Express Terms Are
Supplements
Contingent contracts generally occur in well-developed markets
where transactions are repetitive and specialized terms are specific to the
market or industry rather than to the contract. As a result, parties expe-
rience substantial savings by being able to incorporate the customary
prototypes that typify their contractual context. These savings can best
be captured by an initial presumption that the express terms of the agree-
ment are merely supplementary and that all relevant extrinsic evidence is
incorporated into the contract.
This analysis supports the liberal interpretation of the parol evi-
dence rule adopted by the Code and Second Restatement in order to ease
access to terms impliable from custom and usage. 138 An interpretive pre-
sumption that express terms supplement rather than trump the contrac-
tual context would resolve the initial evidentiary question in our
hypothetical. The evidence of trade usage and performance supports dis-
closure of product research. It would be admissible under the Code's
parol evidence rule and relevant to the interpretation of the express
provision. 139
Interpretive errors in contingent contracts result not from the pre-
sumption that express terms are supplements, but from the failure to ap-
preciate that the parol evidence and plain-meaning rules are separate
mechanisms with different functions. Our analysis challenges the con-
ventional assumption that a liberalized parol evidence rule requires a
similarly loose rule for interpreting the meaning of express terms. The
economic benefits of implication justify the presumption favoring inclu-
136. See id. § 2-306(2) & comment 5.
137. See id. § 2-311(3). If the required cooperation is not forthcoming, "the other party in
addition to all other remedies. . . is excused for any resulting delay in his own performance." Id.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
139. See U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 203(b) & com-
ment d (1979).
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sion of the commercial context. But reluctance to set limits on this pre-
sumption invites the parties to attack even apparently clear, express
trumps. Such attacks weaken the signals used by atypical parties to es-
cape state-supplied terms.
c. The Plain-Meaning Presumption
Most language does not carry the blessing of an official meaning.
The presumption that express terms are supplements therefore requires a
limiting presumption as well: parties are bound by the plain and ordi-
nary meanings of the words used in their agreement. A plain-meaning
presumption limits the probative weight accorded to informal contextual
evidence offered to controvert the apparent meaning of express terms. 140
This presumption challenges those courts who, in order to spare parties
the consequences of inartful wording, have blunted the plain meaning of
terms such as "wife," '141 "all sums,"142 and "alimony." 143 Similarly, the
presumption would limit the effect of inconsistent extrinsic evidence in
our hypothetical contract, since our parties used conventional language
whose plain and ordinary meaning granted unrestricted discretion to De-
velopment. Had the parties used a recognized invocation, an even
stronger argument for limiting the interpretive weight given to extrinsic
evidence would apply. For example, they might have signalled the right
to withhold disclosure "for any reason, with or without cause."' 44 It is
tempting to argue that such a strict construction might subvert the par-
ties' true intentions. However, the ability of contingent contractors to
select language unencumbered by predefined meaning justifies this rule.
The lingering argument against a strong plain-meaning presumption is
that the interpreter must somehow distinguish between meaningful lan-
140. Practically, the presumption would create a relevance issue roughly proportional to the
"plainness" of the express terms. In the extreme case of invocations, context evidence might be held
completely inadmissible. Compare Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th
Cir. 1980) (evidence of course of performance held to vary normal meaning of F.A.S. term in written
contract) and Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1981) (same, CIF term), with
Southern Concrete Servs. v. Mableton Contractors, 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (express term
controls), aff'd 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978) and National Heater Co. v. Corrigan Co. Mechanical
Contractors, 482 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1973) (FOB term can be varied by further express language in
agreement itself.)
141. In re Soper's Estate, 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935) (context evidence admitted to
establish that "wife" did not mean the woman to whom decedent was legally married, but rather the
woman with whom he was living at death).
142. Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (statutory pre-
sumption favoring "reasonable" construction requires phrase "all sums expended" to be interpreted
as "reasonable sums").
143. Kohn v. Kohn, 242 Pa. Super. 435, 364 A.2d 350 (1976) (context evidence admissible to
show parties said "alimony" but meant "child support").
144. These words were used to authorize one party to exercise unlimited discretion in Coren-
swet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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guage and empty boilerplate. 145 As a practical matter, however, few in-
stances of such boilerplate can be identified;146 this problem appears to
have little empirical significance.
An important complement to any plain-meaning presumption is the
use of rules of disclosure to motivate interparty communication. The
Code, for example, requires that disclaimers of implied warranties be
conspicuous.147 Since atypical parties are more likely to know that their
needs are unusual, they properly bear the burden of clearly announcing
the shift in presumptions from the typical to the unusual transaction.
The Code does not specifically require that predefined invocations
trumping customary delivery or credit terms be conspicuous. Neverthe-
145. By "boilerplate" we mean terms that are so uniformly used by rote, or are so embedded in
layers of legal jargon, that their meaning is lost or their intelligibility substantially reduced. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
146. There are, however, some cases that may require the interpreter to distinguish between
plain meaning and boilerplate. Assume, for example, that a buyer of fertilizer seeks to justify his
refusal to order the quantity specified in the written contract by asserting that the trade custom is for
sellers to adjust quantities to reflect declining market conditions. Assume also that the contract
contains the following broad merger clause: "This document represents the final agreement on all
terms, and may not be explained, supplemented or modified by additional terms, usage of trade or
course of dealing." A. SCHWARTZ & R. ScOrr, supra note 4, at 58. Is the merger clause a protected
invocation or is it boilerplate?
Several recent cases have determined (at least implicitly) that such a general merger clause is
boilerplate and thus not insulated from the contractual context. See, eg., Nanakuli Paving & Rock
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (standard-form merger clause excluding evidence
of dealings or usages did not "carefully negate" all uses of such evidence). Even evidence of addi-
tional terms is not necessarily excluded by a boilerplate merger clause. See, eg., Sunbury Textile
Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 1190 (3rd Cir. 1978) (extrinsic evidence of intention admissi-
ble despite merger clause).
An exception to the plain-meaning presumption for broad merger clauses is consistent with the
empirical assumptions that underlie the market for contingent contracts. In discrete, sequential
transactions, the costs of particularization are frequently too high to justify attempts to improve the
accuracy of express contractual instructions. Rather, formulation begins by tentatively incorporat-
ing the informal prototypes that have evolved from market contexts and from ongoing relationships.
The nature of contingent contracting thus refutes any allegations that standard-form, general merger
clauses carry talismanic implications that would exclude all "unofficial" implied terms. It is possible
to imagine a party so sufficiently idiosyncratic as to wish to particularize the entire transaction.
However, the nature of this type of contractual relationship justifies a strong presumption that broad
merger clauses, although perhaps excluding additional express terms, do not exclude evidence of
context.
The denial of talismanic power to standard merger clauses requires parties who wish to escape
context to do so by more precise expression. While the requisite precision is more costly for such
parties than a simple incantation of a standard magic phrase, the boilerplate presumption is likely to
minimize formulation costs for most contingent contractors. The conclusion that a clause is boiler-
plate necessarily assumes that it has been inappropriately included in prior contracts. This pattern
of historic, inappropriate use justifies the conclusion that the words have been emptied of legal
meaning.
147. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978). Language in a written contract is conspicuous "when it is so
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." Id. § 1-
201(10). "[Ihe test is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it." Id. § 1-201
comment 10.
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less, a clear signal is fairly implied since the Code stipulates that extrinsic
evidence of usages or dealings becomes an element of the meaning of the
words used unless "carefully negated."14
d. The Institutional Interest in "Balanced" Interpretation
A plain-meaning presumption can have a marginal influence in re-
ducing errors that result from the use of ambiguous signals where clear
ones are available. Perhaps more importantly, skillful use of the pre-
sumption by courts will, over time, increase the supply of officially recog-
nized invocations and other express conventions. Conversely, a failure to
appreciate the distinct effects of the plain-meaning and parol evidence
rules can strip terms of their meanings and thus erode the established
stock of express preformulations.
In one illustrative case, the seller attempted to introduce evidence of
a course of performance between the parties to suggest that the buyer
had agreed to pay for unloading and storage charges. 149 The court ad-
mitted the evidence despite the contract's F.A.S. shipment term, a Code-
defined invocation providing that, unless otherwise agreed, the seller
pays for unloading and storage charges.1 50 Is the course of performance
a supplementary "agreement" and thus consistent with the F.A.S. term?
Or is the context trumped since it imposes a meaning for the term that is
diametrically opposed to its definition in the Code and in local usage?
Unfortunately, the proper relation between language and context cannot
be determined by even the most exhaustive search for the meaning of the
parties. Resolution necessarily turns on the state's treatment of the con-
tractual signals used by the parties.
The court apparently assumed that the F.A.S. term is a broad, gen-
eral-purpose shipment term used to signal a set of performance obliga-
tions. Under that view, the course of performance would be evidence of
a more carefully tailored implied term that redesigns the somewhat ill-
fitting conventional meaning that the Code and local usage applied to
F.A.S. The discussion above has shown, however, that legal recognition
of prevailing contextual patterns threatens the parallel process of recog-
nizing similarly useful express signals. In order to protect the express
conventions from such institutional bias, the F.A.S. term must be recog-
nized as a narrowly defined invocation crafted by the Code to permit
escape from implied terms. Under this interpretation, the course of per-
formance would be clearly trumped by the talismanic meaning attributed
to the F.A.S. term. After all, if parties are to use express terms to trump
implied terms, the language they use for this purpose must be insulated
148. See id. § 2-202 comment 2.
149. Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980).
150. U.C.C. § 2-319(2) (1978).
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from the context that they are seeking to escape. Only additional express
language should properly be permitted to modify an express convention;
otherwise, reliance on the factual context will create a presumptive an-
swer to the very question being posed.
But few words and phrases have sufficiently clear legal meaning to
fall within the protection of the plain-meaning presumption. Unfortu-
nately, the current regulatory process of judicial interpretation and occa-
sional legislative codification produces less than an optimal supply of
established conventions. Contracting parties often must resort to uncer-
tain signals. Where the words used have ambiguous meanings, extrinsic
evidence remains a necessary interpretive tool for distinguishing in-
artfully worded supplementary provisions from express trumps. This
process carries an inherent and unavoidable risk of interpretation error.
In sum, even the most skillful use of interpretive presumptions can be
regarded as only a long-term solution to the problem.
3. Indeterminate Signals: The Dilemma of Relational Contracting
Interpretive presumptions designed to minimize the error caused by
the interaction between implied and express terms are most effective
when applied to contingent contracts. The interpretation problem takes
on different dimensions with relational contracts, where the interpreter
may be called upon to distinguish between terms that are inadvertently
equivocal and those that are deliberately indeterminate. Relational con-
tracts create interdependent relationships in which unknown contingen-
cies or the intricacy of a desired response may prevent parties from
articulating their agreement with precision."' Under these conditions,
contractual terms may be problematic in a more limited sense than that
just discussed. Terms of trade may intentionally be left imprecise as a
"lesser of evils" expedient. The obvious solution to incompleteness-ex-
press particularization-incurs great risks of misinterpretation. It may
therefore be preferable to allow the parties to employ deliberately inde-
terminate formulations, which implicitly instruct the dispute-resolver to
construe the contract equitably. What is called for here is not an inter-
pretation of the definitive terms as either supplements or trumps; but
rather an equitable "filling in of the blanks" in light of conditions that
were either difficult to anticipate or impractical to describe in advance.
Indeterminate terms are sometimes signalled as such at the time of
contracting. Familiar examples of such indeterminate formulations are
agreements to do something in a "commercially reasonable time" or to
use "best efforts." Both statutory definition and common sense indicate
that "a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, pur-
151. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 4, at 1089-91.
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pose, and circumstances of such action." 15 2 Likewise, best efforts is a
term "which necessarily takes its meaning from the circumstances." 113
Frequently, however, at the time they contract, the parties are insuffi-
ciently aware of the need to adjust their relationship in the future. Thus,
the signal of indeterminacy may be implicit, and the distinction between
provisions that are deliberately indeterminate and those intended either
as supplements or trumps will less easily be drawn."4
Suppose, for instance, that in the hypothetical relationship between
Development and Marketing discussed earlier there are important uncer-
tainties about many aspects of future technological developments. Mar-
152. U.C.C. § 1-204(2) (1978).
153. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Perma
Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 308 F. Supp. 743, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)), affid, 601 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1979).
154. The peculiar problems that affect the interpretation of disputed relational contracts are
illustrated by the recent case of Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1981). Nanakuli, a paving contractor, negotiated a long-term contract with Shell in which Shell
agreed to supply and Nanakuli agreed to purchase all its asphalt requirements. After extensive
negotiations and drafting, a written contract was signed providing that the contract price for asphalt
ordered and supplied was to be determined by Shell's "posted price at the time of delivery." The
written contract contained a standard merger clause. Some ten years after the original agreement
was concluded, Shell increased the price on a delivery of 7,200 tons of asphalt from the $44 per ton
price prevailing at the time of the order to $76 per ton, its posted price at the time of delivery.
Subsequently, Nanakuli sought $220,800 in damages for breach of the contract, alleging that the
paving trade in Hawaii followed a practice of "price protection" by extending the old price for a
period of time after a new one became effective. Nanakuli claimed that Shell had protected it from
price increases in two previous instances. In response, Shell argued that if the relevant market were
narrowed to the supply of asphalt alone, the usage was not clearly established. Shell further claimed
that the two instances of price protection were isolated waivers, not a course of performance. Fi-
nally, it said that in any event the extrinsic evidence was clearly inconsistent with the express price
term in the contract and thus the price term was controlling under U.C.C. § 1-205(4).
In reinstating the jury's verdict for Nanakuli, the Ninth Circuit held that the jury could prop-
erly have found a relevant usage and course of performance, and that this extrinsic evidence was not
inconsistent with the express price term in the written contract. At first glance, Nanakuli seems to
be a perfectly correct application of the rules of interpretation developed above. The court applied a
presumption of consistency to the extrinsic evidence submitted by the buyer, holding that the express
price term supplemented, rather than trumped, the price protection usage. The presumption was not
overcome by the inclusion of a standard merger clause, which the court characterized as boilerplate
rather than as an invoked term of art.
Further reflection, however, reveals an underlying conceptual problem. The court in Nanakull
framed the interpretive issue as a choice between supplementary expressions and trumps. This re-
quires a binary resolution: either the express price term trumps the context or the price protection
usage fully applies. While such a resolution may be entirely appropriate for contingent contracts, it
may not be for relational contexts like the Nanakuli-Shell transaction. In such relationships, it is
equally plausible to assume that the apparent conflict between the express price term and the custom
of price-protection could not have been "solved" by the parties when they crafted their agreement.
This hypothesis is supported by evidence that the price-protection issue first arose in 1970, seven
years after the supply contract was negotiated and following major changes in Shell's management.
If the formulations in Nanakuli were indeterminate rather than apparently inconsistent, then neither
the outcome endorsed by the court nor the result urged by Shell would represent the optimal inter-
pretive solution. Instead, an equitable adjustment of price would have been more consistent with the
contractual instructions of the parties.
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keting might then be unwilling to risk granting Development the clear
but dangerously sweeping discretionary provision assumed in our earlier
example.1 55 Instead, the parties agree that "[d]evelopment reserves the
right to take appropriate steps to protect its proprietary interests in tech-
nical developments." How would this alteration affect the resolution of
the interpretive dispute? The earlier case was resolvable by the plain-
meaning presumption. Under the present facts, however, the express for-
mulation is not clearly a trump of the customary assumptions of disclo-
sure. Therefore, the presumption that express terms are supplements
seems to allow Marketing to establish, through usage and course of per-
formance, the normal duty of mandatory disclosure. But that resolution
assumes that the precise type of "appropriate steps" protection desired
by Development could have been anticipated and clearly dealt with at the
time of contracting. While such an assumption may be entirely appropri-
ate for contingent contracting, it cannot be made with confidence in rela-
tional contexts. The parties to a relational contract may have failed to
provide more detailed instructions simply because they were incapable of
anticipating their needs precisely.
In this case, the parties implicitly have chosen an indeterminate in-
struction. An equitable adjustment of the relationship would be more
consistent with that instruction than would either of the extremes of full
disclosure or absolute discretion.156 Under this analysis, broad or flexible
obligations-such as the "appropriate steps" performance standard
agreed to between Development and Marketing-are an implicit request
for equitable definition of the standards for subsequent performance,
with the interests of both parties to be taken equally into account. This
joint maximization conception of the nature of relational obligations ex-
pands the contractual benefits to be divided prospectively between the
parties. 157 For example, it seems plausible to assume that the parties
would have agreed that "appropriate steps" might require Development
to balance its normal obligations of cooperation against its protective in-
terest in any exceptionally sensitive future research-the precise nature of
155. On the one hand, Marketing will recognize that withholding information will be legitimate
in certain circumstances. On the other hand, it will fear that Development may wish to withhold
information in unjustified circumstances. Development has a similar set of concerns. Moreover, the
parties will lack confidence in their ability to foresee and describe hypothetical conditions that con-
trol whether information may be withheld. In addition, our earlier example may have been unrealis-
tic in assuming that the clear solution, in which Marketing bears all of the risk, is economically
tolerable.
156. See generally Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Con-
tracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1981); Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contractv Some
Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REv. 241, 279 (1980).
157. See Goetz & Scott, Relational Contracts, supra note 4, at 1112-17. Of course, the benefits
from "equitable adjustment" must be weighed against the increased uncertainty that such open-
ended interventions may impose on contracting parties.
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which would presently be impossible to describe."' 8 On the other hand,
nondisclosure is not an "appropriate step" for the more typical informa-
tion exchanges where the special interests of Development do not out-
weigh those of Marketing.
Unfortunately, current rules of interpretation provide few effective
mechanisms for distinguishing between apparent inconsistency and delib-
erate indeterminacy. For relational contractors, therefore, interpretive
disputes will essentially be a lottery until the state provides the requisite
instruments for more accurate signalling. To advance the normative
objectives of contract law, courts must promote the evolution of
predefined invocations that clearly trigger such equitable resolutions of
interpretational disputes.
Technological changes in the legal dispute-resolution mechanisms
might reduce some of the inherent tensions infecting interpretation of
relational contracts. One ambitious form of state support would be for
courts to issue on request private "letter rulings" at the initial stages of
negotiated contracts. Ex ante interpretive rulings would enhance the re-
liability of contractual formulations. Rulings of general interest could be
published, thus accelerating the process of legal recognition for express
contractual prototypes. The cost of the additional state subsidy could be
kept roughly congruent with the level of social benefits by retaining dis-
cretionary authority to reject requests. 159 As an alternative mechanism
for reducing formulation error, the state could endorse the parties' ex
ante choice of interpretive presumptions. If the state provided a menu of
clearly defined presumptions or interpretive meta-rules, private contrac-
tors could select the principles and the assumptions that would govern
the resolution of any dispute.)"
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the dynamic process in which contracting
parties choose combinations of express and implied terms to formulate
their agreements. .Conventional resource-cost analysis supports the gen-
erally held view that the state's intervention facilitates this formulation
process by providing widely suitable "off the rack" provisions, while
leaving atypical parties free to design other, more unusual provisions.
But whether or not their goals are atypical, parties desire to reduce
158. In our software example, for instance, major developments such as spreadsheets, integrated
software, and "windowing" would have been impossible to anticipate or describe until a very short
time before they occurred. In addition, each of these developments presents different protective
secrecy problems.
159. See generally Portney, supra note 112.
160. See, eg., Buffalo Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Trumix Concrete Co., 641 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982) (construing ambiguous contract according to construction given by parties themselves).
(Vol. 73:261
CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
the errors caused by defects in the contractual formulations that express
those goals. From this perspective, the role of the state has a markedly
different cast. State-supplied terms offer advantages over privately-pro-
vided terms by reducing the risk of various types of design defect. How-
ever, since contractual formulations must satisfy both conventional and
atypical purposes, state action in implying terms from the commercial
context cannot fully mitigate the risk of error. The state must permit
private parties to use express terms to redesign the implied agreement.
Unfortunately, attempts to combine express and implied terms increase
the danger that the agreement, as finally assembled, will contain design
defects or error-causing uncertainties. The promise of expanded choice
thus impels the state to provide standardized terms, both express and
implied, that reduce the risks associated with these untested combina-
tions. Ironically, by officially recognizing standard terms, the state is
also implicitly regulating the formulation process.
State regulation of contractual formulations suffers from two
problems. First, there is an institutional bias against unconventional
methods of expression. To the extent that parties with conventional
goals are channeled into conventional, error-minimizing formulations,
this bias is socially desirable. Unfortunately, the bias also operates
against the use of unconventional signals by parties pursuing nonstan-
dard goals in what appear to be conventional contexts. By preferring
implied over express terms, the state makes creative or innovative formu-
lations more costly. Second, the state's continuing control of interpreta-
tion-the primary recognition mechanism-restrains already weak
market forces that might encourage innovation. The fundamental ten-
sion between the general advantages of standardization and the accom-
modation of nonstandard goals thus adversely impacts the effective range
of choice available to contracting parties. Even with unlimited expendi-
tures on negotiating and drafting, contractors who combine state-sup-
plied terms with attempted private improvements may not attain the
formulations most appropriate to their substantive needs.
Our discussion has not identified any irrationalities in the pattern of
private responses to contractual goals. To the extent that problems exist,
therefore, remedial measures must be directed to the institutional frame-
work, specifically, to the interpretive constraints that affect party choices.
Much of the current uncertainty over proper modes of interpretation has
resulted from two largely unrecognized failures of understanding. One of
these is lack of attention to the distinct ways in which contractual formu-
lations may be defective. The other is a reluctance to confront the inter-
dependent and inherently conflicting processes by which contractual
formulations develop. If contractual interpretation is successfully to re-
duce error, the state's modes of intervention must be sensitive both to the
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needs of the evolutionary process itself, and to the appropriate responses
to the various types of formulation error.
The appropriate policy responses involve classic tradeoffs. If the
state follows the example of the Code in expansively incorporating con-
textual patterns, it will impose a corresponding burden on contracting
parties who attempt unconventional expressions. On the other hand, if
the state adheres to the narrower interpretive framework of the common
law, the risk of formulation error will increase. Parties will be denied
convenient access to the tested, co'st-effective formulations embedded in
their contractual context. In contingent contracts, the aggregate cost of
formulation error will be minimized if the state explicitly acknowledges
the need for incentives to produce both express and implied conventions.
In relational contexts, while clearer signals are not available, recognition
of the state's role can nevertheless serve to eliminate egregious errors of
interpretation that increase aggregate costs.
